Command failures

Army, Mar 2003 by Ossad, Steven L

The "velvet-lined" CP suggested excessive concern for personal security, exactly the wrong impression of American leadership Ike wanted to convey. As he noted in his memoir, "It was the only time during the war that I ever saw a divisional or higher headquarters so concerned over its own safety that it dug itself underground shelters." He tried earlier to convey his displeasure, writing in early February to Fredendall that "one of the things that gives me the most concern is the habit of some of our generals in staying too close to their command posts. Please watch this very carefully among all your subordinates," but his indirect effort at signaling his feelings to Fredendall fell on deaf ears. The impact of the visit was still vivid nearly two months later when Eisenhower paid another call on II Corps, now under the command of Omar Bradley. Putting his arm on his shoulder, Eisenhower told him, "Brad, I'm sure glad to see you spread out like this in the open. Once when I visited Fredendall in his CP near Tebessa I found II Corps dug into the damnedest canyon you ever saw."

While at Tebessa, Eisenhower was visited by Gen. Anderson, who warned again in a staff conference of an impending German attack, which he expected in the northern sector. This analysis, which was based on ULTRA intercepts but nevertheless proved to be wrong and very nearly disastrous, was consistent with Eisenhower's own intelligence (G-2) assessment. Fredendall, relying on his competent and loyal G-2, Col. Benjamin A. (Monk) Dickson, derisively (and correctly) dismissed Andersen's warning, suggesting that the expected attack was likely to be in his sector. He cited reports of greater enemy resistance to reconnaissance patrols, increased noise from vehicles, larger enemy troop buildups, and, most ominous, the fact that Arab workers were quickly disappearing.

What struck Eisenhower, however, was not the intelligence dispute-as it turned out, he would relieve his own G-2, English Brig. Eric E. Mockler-Ferryman, for the error of judgment in relying solely on ULTRA-but rather the atmosphere during the conference. Anderson had earlier refused Fredendall's request for American troops still held in the north to be released to II Corps, and the mood was palpably hostile. This obvious lack of cooperation, even animosity, among his top battlefield generals was even more disturbing than the public embarrassment of the command post. The achievement of a true coalition, after all, was-and remained throughout the war-his main command preoccupation. There had already been reports that Fredendall had made anti-British comments and Ike personally warned him that "our allies have to be partners and not people that we view with suspicion and doubt." Eisenhower remarked to Patton-possibly as a warning to him to control his well-known and arguably even more extreme outspokenness-that if the complaint against Fredendall were true, "by God I'll bust him."

Accompanied by Truscott, aides and II Corps staff officers, Ike visited the frontline positions and 1st Armored headquarters later that day. It did nothing to quiet his concerns. The troop dispositions were disappointing, with infantry, tank and artillery units intermixed and based on widely separated hills unable to support each other. It was exactly the "penny packet" formations that had led to British defeats in the early phase of the Desert War. Eisenhower's original idea was to maintain the 1st Armored as a fully massed and mobile reaction force able to intervene decisively wherever needed. Now it was scattered all over the field. Even more troubling, Ike learned that Fredendall had never visited the front and that the deployments were based on maps hanging in his underground headquarters.