Command failures

Army, Mar 2003 by Ossad, Steven L

The troops in the field seemed complacent and sloppy and were obviously green. It was also clear that Orlando Ward, a friend from West Point, detested his commander and could hardly contain his hostility. Ike noted the complaints about the deployments and said he would address them. With an attack expected at any moment, Ike was very apprehensive. His men had not yet met the vaunted Wehrmacht in combat and yet two of his most important senior commanders were barely on speaking terms. Still, he did nothing; in fact, he wrote to Marshall right after the visit that he was impressed by Fredendall's "thorough knowledge of his battlefront. He seems keen and fit and I am placing a lot of confidence in him."

The next morning, February 14, 1943, just three hours after Eisenhower had completed his tour of the front lines, Generaloberst Jurgen von Arnim's 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions delivered a brutal St. Valentine's Day greeting to the Americans, striking hard at Sidi bou Zid. After two days of hard fighting, a large part of the 1st Armored Division had been destroyed and nearly 100 tanks, as well as dozens of guns, half-tracks and other vehicles lay burned or abandoned on the battlefield, next to the bodies of hundreds of dead and wounded Americans. The first engagements can only be described as a rout; men threw away their weapons and ran in panic towards the rear, with their backs to the enemy. It was like some terrible modern enactment of Stephen Crane's Civil War vision in The Red Badge of Courage. Omar Bradley described it as "the worst performance of U.S. Army troops in their whole proud history."

By the end of one week, Rommel's veterans had pushed the Americans back 50 miles and were moving through the Kasserine Pass toward Thala and the supply depot (and II Corps headquarters) at Tebessa. Fredendall abandoned his elaborate CP and was completely out of touch for a while. By February 23, however, it was over, although no one realized it at the time. A lack of supplies, American fire-power, bickering among the German command and concern about the British moving west towards their rear, halted the enemy thrust. Disaster was narrowly averted, and the Americans were granted a reprieve-no thanks to their leadership.

Eisenhower's response to the growing crisis in command was still indecisive, even at this late stage. Although troubled by Fredendall for some time, he didn't want to relieve him in the middle of the battle. He wrote:

The relief of a combat leader is something that is not to be lightly done in war. Its first effect is to indicate to troops dissatisfaction with their performance; otherwise, the commander would be commended, not relieved. ... On the other hand, really inept leadership must be quickly detected and instantly removed.

Nearly two weeks passed before he took any action. Many believe that Eisenhower was hesitant to act because of Fredendall's sponsors. Some cite Marshall; others, Lesley McNair. Perhaps Eisenhower was still unsure whether Ward was the one that should be relieved, as Fredendall had suggested on several occasions. Clearly, however, something had to be done.