War in Iraq: Shock and awe?

Army, May 2003 by Atkeson, Edward B

It has been just over a month since the President of the United States announced his decision to terminate attempts to settle differences with Saddam Hussein of Iraq peacefully and to "let slip the dogs of war" on that ancient land. Observers have expressed a broad range of opinions on the effort-the timing, the moral justification for offensive action and its connection (or lack thereof) with the larger task of a war of retribution for the dreadful 9/11 crimes of 2001. The American public has demonstrated strong backing for the President's decision, and more especially for the servicemembers who have played a part in the endeavor. Others at home and around the world have expressed grave reservations over the war, calling for a reversal of policies promulgated by the White House and the Pentagon.

The Secretary of Defense has accurately remarked that it is too soon to begin writing the history of the war, but that has not proven a bar to public debate.

American military professionals are largely unperturbed by the controversy. They recognize that the expression of personal views is a precious aspect of American life and tradition. The people's right to speak out on public policy is guaranteed by the Constitution, the basic law of the land. It is thus part of the raison d'etre of the armed forces.

At the same time, professionals may look critically at aspects and procedures involved in the many tasks required to fulfill the President's orders without necessarily implying either enthusiasm or criticism of the leadership's intent. Their focus is on the organization and employment of the forces and the efficiency of mission execution. Shrill exchanges of bumper sticker shibboleths with those of differing views is not for them. Far more beneficial is a dispassionate examination of reports from the field for the identification of possible lessons applicable both to current operations and to those of the future.

According to Washington Post writer Bob Woodward (author of Bush at War), Iraqi Freedom began in the mind of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as a contrivance for crystallizing interest in a campaign in Iraq. Reportedly, he envisioned an international coalition joining the United States in the anticipated "monumental struggle between good and evil" desired by the President in reaction to the 9/11 attacks. Woodward wrote that the upper echelons of the Pentagon had been studying Saddam Hussein for some time, suspicious of his interest in weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) and looking for a way to get at him. Here was their opportunity. They had some difficulty in tying Saddam to the terrorists of 9/11; nevertheless, the proposal proved attractive to the administration. Saddam was an undesirable under any circumstances.

Secretary of State Colin Powell led an effort to test the necessity for attacking Iraq immediately. He argued in favor of United Nations investigations of alleged Iraqi violations of previous Security Council resolutions limiting the types of weaponry permitted Baghdad after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In his view, the United States would have better luck in assembling an international coalition of concerned countries if it first pursued peaceful means for resolving the questions. He was successful in achieving a unanimous vote from the Council for a resumption of inspections in Iraq for contraband weaponry, but he found the Iraqis less than fully cooperative. He also found the Council disinclined to stiffen its previous resolution, so, with the backing of the majority of the U.S. Congress, the President announced his intent to resort to force.

Unfortunately, the disagreement among Council members resulted in a degree of isolation of the United States, albeit in company with its most loyal ally, the United Kingdom. The principal military consequence would be the assembly of a much smaller force from the coalition of states for the new Iraqi campaign than had been previously gathered for expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in the Gulf War.

In spite of this development, the U.S. leadership was undaunted. It was convinced that enormous strides in weapons technology had so advanced the capabilities of our forces for high speed, predominantly air warfare, that the participation of forces from a large number of friendly countries had been rendered virtually irrelevant. This was to be a new kind of conflict, known to the cognoscenti as "Shock and Awe."

To grasp a sense of the magnitude of change which aficionados of the new doctrine believed to have occurred, it is instructive to glance back to the writings of some of the best minds in the business in the past. One of the contributors to Edward Mead Earle's noted volume, Makers of Modern Strategy, stands out. In his treatise on Clausewitz, Dr. Hans Rothfels highlighted a historic watershed of the 18th century. He wrote:

The ascendancy of the Napoleonic blitzkrieg was eventually checked when the growing size of the French armies was not matched by an increasing ability to handle them.