Nuclear bees in North Korea

Army, Aug 2003 by Collins, John M

North Korean Retorts: Winston Churchill once said, "However absorbed a commander may be in the elaboration of his own thoughts, it is sometimes necessary to take the enemy into account." The DPRK could respond to U.S. overtures in several different ways. Among other things, U.S.-ROK Options A, B and C would constitute preemptive acts of war and thereby legally allow North Korea to retaliate in accord with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which explicitly states that "nothing shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security" (italics in the original). The DPRK has been a U.N. member in good standing since September 17, 1991.

* DPRK Option A: Intensify Transnational Terrorism. Highly publicized DPRK atrocities during the last 35 years include a 1968 guerrilla attack on the Blue House (South Korea's White House) and a botched attempt to assassinate ROK President Park Chung Hee that spared him, but killed his wife, in 1974. Assassins in Rangoon missed President Chun Doo Hwan, but butchered six ROK cabinet ministers along with 11 aides in 1983. Bombers in 1987 obliterated a South Korean airliner with 115 passengers and crew aboard.

North Korean terrorists have been quiescent ever since, but Kim Jong Il provides technicians, trainers, weapons and other support to renegade groups and states that engage in transnational terrorism. DPRK Option A would expand the scope and intensity of such activities and perhaps include direct North Korean actions on unprecedented scales.

* DPRK Option B: Invade South Korea. Kim Il Sung and his successor Kim Jong Il have ignored temptations to invade South Korea on at least three occasions since 1953. The first window of opportunity opened between 1965 and 1972, when U.S. armed forces were heavily involved in the Vietnam War. Post-war pacifism made American military intervention politically improbable between 1973 and 1981. The third opportunity spanned August 1990 through February 1991, when the campaign to liberate Kuwait occupied most U.S. long-haul airlift and sealift assets plus major combat formations.

Guaranteed risks seemed to outweigh uncertain gains in each of those instances, but preemptive U.S. Options B and C could trigger a North Korean invasion on extremely short notice if Kim Jong Il believed he had little to lose. Three strategic objectives appear plausible: rapidly penetrate U.S. and ROK defenses that hug the DMZ; seize and hold Seoul hostage to encourage early ROK capitulation; control the entire peninsula before U.S. reinforcements arrive. Ballistic missiles almost certainly would attack high-level military command posts, seaports, air bases, telecommunication nodes and logistical installations. North Korean special operations forces, which total about 90,000, might attack political leaders and other sensitive targets to create countrywide confusion and expedite the progress of armored spearheads. Their capacity for destruction would be immense, even if cited strength figures were a small fraction of those claimed. Chemical weapons could magnify defensive problems considerably.