On Guerrillas: Warfare in Iraq

Army,  Jan 2004  by Greer, Steven J

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Following the pronouncement of the end of major combat operations in Iraq on May 1, 2003, coalition forces embarked on a monumental struggle to provide stabilization and security and chart a course towards a prosperous and democratic new Iraq.

As the days turned into weeks, and weeks bled into months, we have witnessed the appearance of insurgent forces and foreign terrorists who aim to destabilize the coalition's efforts, and are seemingly comfortable fighting in the shadows while interdicting our soldiers with impunity.

At present, we are witness to increased sophistication in the use of improvised explosive devices (IED), field expedient detonators and fabricated rocket launchers for munitions such as the 107 mm rocket, type 63, Chinese. This particular rocket has a long history with guerrillas. The Vietminh used them effectively against the French in Indochina. The Viet Cong used them against American troops at Cam Rahn Air Base. The Mujhadeen used them extensively during their insurgent campaign with the Soviets. Hezbollah and Lebanese guerrillas used them against the Israelis at the border of Lebanon and al Qaeda and Taliban rebels have used them rather unsuccessfully against our forces in Afghanistan.

It is prudent to reason that the average Iraqi soldier has little or no knowledge of IEDs or electromagnetic firing devices. Similarly, a typical U.S Army infantry battalion will not have many skilled at this type of demo setup. Only specially trained soldiers in our Army (Special Forces teams, Rangers who have been to master breacher courses, explosive ordnance disposal personnel) possess this knowledge. In Iraq, it is obvious that Islamic extremist have crossed the porous borders, linked up with guerrillas and are providing a train-the-trainer program to teach these unique skills. This union of terrorist and guerrilla forces is an increasingly deadly combination for the coalition; to counter it requires knowledge of guerrilla warfare strategy.

Unfortunately, the majority of our military establishment, including this author, has difficulty identifying solutions to the current situation in Iraq. This, coupled with the absence of training and education in guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency, has proved troublesome. Clearly, coalition forces are engaged in counterinsurgency operations, which historically have proven most difficult and trying for both American forces and American politics. Suppressing a guerrilla operation without alienating the indigenous population represents an extreme challenge, the seriousness of which does not appear to be broadly understood.

The more we conduct counterinsurgency, the more indicators are that we have missed the mark in terms of education, preparation, strategy and tactics of guerrillas and their modus operandi. Clearly, our forces are learning tough lessons in unconventional warfare. Iraq remains ripe for the astute insurgent and tailor-made for guerrilla tactics, techniques and procedures. These lessons learned must be studied and analyzed quickly at our senior service colleges, combat training centers and other training venues. In guerrilla warfare, insurgents' goals are best met through protracted warfare-time is on their side. Unfortunately, the U.S.-led coalition does not enjoy such luxury.

This insurgency represents the sole similarity to Vietnam and our struggle to defeat the Viet Cong who were engaged in an armed attempt to overthrow the South Vietnamese government. Similarly, Baath party loyalists, as well as fedayeen, or "men of sacrifice," have managed to organize a terror campaign, choosing to strike soft targets-soldiers in military convoys, traffic control points and other unhardened sites. Moreover, foreign terrorists have joined the fight and are now striking at typical terrorist targets using suicide bombers, car bombs, improvised rocket launchers and "Trojan horse" methodologies.

One could assert that the level of intensity at this point is strategically insignificant, even though we are losing soldiers daily. To accept that argument is to believe that guerrilla warfare cannot possibly affect the overall strategy in Iraq. However, guerrilla warfare can have a disproportionate effect strategically, even if it can be tactically and operationally managed. Why? Simply put, we cannot hope to ever truly eradicate the guerrillas or cease the insurgency completely any more than we can stop crime in our cities. Thus, we must understand that mission success in Iraq cannot be realistically tied to the cessation of guerrilla activity. Long after we are gone from the sands of Iraq, insurgency may continue. The insurgency is much less about fighting the coalition and much more about preventing the implementation and success of a new democracy.

The only way to crush an insurgency is to recognize and appreciate it. Historically, our military education system has balked at providing a sound foundation for fighting insurgent strategies in favor of more conventional tactical scenarios. There is a growing misconception that the only troops who engage in counterinsurgency operations are Special Forces. In reality, special operations forces are limited in what they can do in the field of counterinsurgency and, as evident in Iraq, conventional forces will be fully engaged.