Letters

Army, Apr 2004

March Issue

* There are several items in the March issue that sparked a desire to comment.

Col. Robert Killebrew's article, "The Wartime Army of Today," strikes me as sober, thoughtful and significant. As an ordnance officer with logistics experience within and above division level, I concur with his comments about "lean" logistics. (Having an MBA and a doctorate in industrial engineering, I have seen more than enough references to lean this and just-in-time that.) There is nothing wrong with delivering beans and bullets "just in time"-the problem is, unlike an automobile assembly line, the users don't always know when "in time" will be, in time to get it there. The lives and comfort of our soldiers are at stake, so for heaven's sake, let's have reasonably enough on hand. And you can't fly everything in at the last minute. Certainly modern computer systems can provide much more visibility of stock and allow for timely cross-leveling.

I enjoyed William Gardner Bell's short article on his relationships with German generals. Thanks for sharing it.

Of course, I feel qualified to comment on Lt. Col. Mike Burke's review of War and Gender. He wonders why so many women officers retire as soon as possible. I can speak for myself: my son was dead, my daughter was two, and the Army won't love you when you're 65. The Army was all-consuming for the years I served, and I did not regret it, nor do I regret retiring. (As this chatty, informal writing may demonstrate, I have apparently shed the staff-officer style.) I am proud to be an Army retiree, and I have been able to influence and enjoy my daughter's childhood.

I am 5' 10''; I worked out with weights and ran 10 and 20 K Volksmarches on weekends. I ran faster than the younger women in my company and on post. Yet, I could not have kept up with my platoon of all young men if they had wanted to run me into the dirt. They knew it, and I admitted it. Regarding the "real but small" differences in physical size and strength the study found, please emphasize the "real."

Now, to the punch line (not too much of a punch): the editor should have excised the reference to "Huns" from Michael Hull's review of Toward the Flame-in the same issue, no less, as Mr. Bell's complimentary comments about German generals.

MAJ. MARY C. BERWANGER,

USA RET., PH.D.

Cincinnati, Ohio

The Need to Change

* The Army's Chief of Staff, Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, has expressed in clear language the fundamental imperative to ensure the Army's ability to meet the challenges it faces in the 21st century: "a campaign-quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mind-set." In "Adapt or Die" (February) Brig. Gen. David A. Fastabend and Col. Robert H. Simpson have ' rightly identified the fundamental requirement to make that happen: create an Army-wide "culture of innovation." They have further developed a logical, well-articulated list of institutional impediments to achieving the Chief's goal and identified seven general behavioral areas they believe must be addressed to change the Army's culture.

At the outset they recognize that changing a large organization's culture is a long, cumulative process since it involves not rational, conscious planning and decision, but rather subconscious assumptions and the resulting collective "state of mind." Thus, it cannot be made to happen by the usual analytical and directive processes, but must grow over time from an Army-wide aggregation of perceived results of leadership decisions and actions.

Explicit in much of their presentation is the importance of initiative, decentralized leadership and execution, the opportunity to advance new ideas and to test them "to the point of failure." A little reflection will convince anyone who has followed the Army's struggles during the last 30 or 40 years between its professed leadership principles and the reality of its leaders' actions will see little new in this latest effort. The authors argue, correctly, that "to alter our culture, we must address everything other than culture." No concerted command-driven program, no "Year of the...," no new staff report will make a dent. Their detailed discussion of the seven behavior areas contains many good ideas that should be implemented. The unfortunate fact, however, is that the sine qua non, the key to progress in all the other areas, is buried in two sentences in "learning-organization behavior" under "open environment": "Reward systems, which are designed and overseen by senior leaders (such as efficiency reports and unit readiness reports), drive behavior. Collective behavior, over time, drives culture."

Some of us have argued for years (see my "Front & Center" piece in the December 2000 ARMY, "Leadership in the 21st Century: Is It Time to Change the System?") that until the senior-driven officer evaluation report system is changed to incorporate some form of peer and subordinate input, the essential mind-set of most senior Army leaders, who in turn promote and reward mirror-image subordinates, will not change. This fact results from human nature. It is not willful, not even conscious. As has been noted by several psychologists and students of leadership, many if not most senior leaders believe they practice empowerment and foster positive command climates, but have no idea how they are seen by peers and subordinates.