Maintaining Momentum In the War on Terrorism

Army, Oct 2004 by McKiernan, David D

Third U.S. Army/Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) remains a fully committed Army service component command in the continuing campaign against terror, supporting nearly 36 months of continuous combat operations, or support to combat operations, as a forward deployed headquarters. As an operational-level headquarters, the command has again reinforced the importance of retaining inherent Army campaign qualities, the ability to set, sustain and support multiple, extended military operations across a very large theater. The soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen and coalition members of the Coalition Joint Forces Land Component Command (CJFLCC) responsible for that campaign's quality represent the best there is in a long and arduous fight to preserve and protect our national interests.

The last 12 months have been extraordinarily challenging for the command. The headquarters wore four "hats" in June 2003: Third U.S. Army, ARCENTx CJFLCC and Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7). Since then, the command relinquished CJTF-7 responsibilities in Iraq to V Corps, reset the headquarters to perform theater-wide sustainment and theater security cooperation activities essential to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) operations, planned and executed the largest rotation of military forces in more than 50 years, supported a key transition of command and control arrangements in Iraq from CJTF-7 to Multinational Force Headquarters-Iraq, and consolidated all Kuwait-based command and control activities to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. All of this was accomplished while supporting a combatant command in continuous contact, prosecuting a range of activities from high-end combat operations to humanitarian relief operations, across the the. The operational-level warfighting experience of the command, earned the hard way, continues to make its way into joint and service schools, clearly advancing a multitude of Transformation goals and objectives, not the least of which has been to inform and shape the Army's modularity redesign work.

Transitions are always difficult, and the complexity and risk associated with executing them increase when executed in contact. CJFLCC's first transition was a battle handover to V Corps in June of last year. The CJTF-7 hat was passed from CJFLCC to V Corps, along with responsibility for post-major combat operations in Iraq. The transition was characterized by uncertainty and an evolving national postwar policy for Iraq. The new Office of the Provisional Authority was just getting on its feet, and the coalition's post-decisive operations stance in Iraq was still being settled as new coalition members were incorporated and battlespace assigned. As V Corps (later III Corps) took responsibility for the CJTF-7 mission in Iraq, the headquarters was tasked to rapidly reset as the coalition joint force land component command to support the redeployment of the Marine Expeditionary Force and elements of V Corps and the deployment and integration of new coalition members. Concurrently, CJFLCC was tasked to resume its theater support cooperation activities and continue what would become an expanding theater sustainment mission with considerable support to Joint Task Force-180 (JTF-180) in land-locked Afghanistan and support to JTF-HOA (Horn of Africa), largely centered in the Horn of Africa area. Nevertheless, the biggest consumer remained CJTF-7. Theater sustainment was and continues to be a no-fail mission and is executed for CJFLCC by the 377th Theater Support Command (TSC), a reserve component (RC) headquarters with a large RC downtrace. These soldiers performed superbly, but sustaining the headquarters and its manpower required considerable leader involvement-given mobilization constraints and timelines.

Even as the headquarters began to refit and reset in the late summer of 2003, the command was tasked to plan for and execute a rotation of forces in Iraq that would exceed in scope and size anything since World War II. The mission was clear: rotate an OIF-1 (Operation Iraqi Freedom-1) force package of approximately 120,000 troops out of Iraq and concurrently deploy an OIF-2 force package of approximately 110,000 troops into Iraq, while ensuring no loss of combat capability to Commander, Combined Joint Task Force-7 (COMCJTF-7). Including the force rotation of coalition partners during the same period, January to May 2004, CJFLCC orchestrated and supported the movement of approximately 250,000 troops and a significant amount of equipment, over a five-month period. The majority of the equipment and personnel deploying and redeploying from or to Iraq passed through Kuwait. The Kuwaitis again stepped up to the plate and provided significant support from their only international airport and a number of their seaport facilities. The convoy support and additional security provided by the Kuwait government was essential to mission success and reinforces the importance of the Kuwaitis as a key and essential ally.

Planning for the rotation began in earnest in September 2003. Linking movement, inbound and outbound, to individual unit reliefs in place, while also ensuring uninterrupted capability to execute offensive operations in Iraq, required exceptionally detailed planning. Key factors influencing the planning effort included a decision to keep units on the ground in the Iraqi theater of operation for a full 365 days and COMCJTF-7's desire to fundamentally change how inbound units would be equipped in OIF-2. With the completion of decisive ground combat operations, executed in large part with heavy formations, it became clear that post-major combat operations required less heavy formations (tanks and Bradleys) and more mobile but still armor-protected platforms (up-armored Humvees). The transition from heavy to a mix of heavy/motorized formations posed unique challenges. Further complicating rotation planning was a clear appreciation of the vulnerability of extended and limited lines of communication (LOCs) throughout Iraq and the inability to leverage a number of airfields in Iraq capable of serving as intertheater (strategic) aerial ports of embarkation/debarkation (APOE/Ds). The security situation precluded the use of contracted airlift and forced extensive ground movement to and from Iraq. The air component to CENTCOM, U.S. Central Command Air Force (CENTAF), made available a number of C-130 transport aircraft on a daily basis to move troops and equipment, relieving to some extent, the pressure on the use of ground LOCs. Still, the great majority of movement was executed overland and, given the security situation, CJTF-7 developed and executed a sustained, offensive-focused operation to secure these critical links.