Air and Missile Defense Soldiers: Historic Transformation

Army, Dec 2004 by Vane, Michael A

One immediate change in AMD will be standing up the composite battalion next year that will consist of short-range air defense (Avenger) and Patriot batteries that will provide wider and more concentrated protection for the force on the ground and in the air. The Army, with its Patriot force, has the only anti-TBM capability in the world, so it needs to maintain that capability while developing the future capabilities to more effectively counter cruise missiles. A panel of experts led by retired four star officers from all services were recently asked to look at this AMD problem and advise if a single service option would be the best solution. The resounding response from the joint panel was that a multilayered defense was required, and that it was more efficient to leverage the capabilities of each service and retain the joint capability.

One other aspect of transforming AMD is to get away from weapon systems and platform-centric capabilities, whether they reside in the Navy, the Air Force or the Army. We must move to a systems approach that allows us to field sensors, command and control systems and shooters that come from sister services. A systems approach will not only allow us to achieve the ballistic and conventional capability of the missiles we have, but will also enable us to do it in a more efficient and effective manner.

It is increasingly important that services operate in an interdependent fashion. Each is developing capabilities that may have been originally designed for only the third dimension, only on the ground or only on the water. As we generate capabilities of the future, however, we want to ensure that we have interlocking capabilities. We must also ensure that there are no gaps or seams between service capabilities.

We must agree jointly on what we are trying to accomplish, have an understanding of the threat and the capabilities that already exist, and match them against potential threat capabilities. Communications between general officers, flag officers and action officers within each of our services is the key. Then we can match capabilities against current and future threats and work on a joint solution.

Increasingly, our vulnerabilities are in the third dimension, where terrain and man-made obstacles are not inhibitors. There are cheaper and different types of threats, maneuverable threats that can disable our efforts from longer ranges. It means greater situational understanding and awareness, early warning and an ability to kill the enemy at longer ranges, in the air, on the ground and with terminal defense. As we gain control of terrain, resources and people, we must be able to efficiently conduct close combat within cities where most of the world's population is now located, as demonstrated in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Getting there and achieving a quick win is sometimes not enough. Under some conditions, we must commit to resourcing over the long haul to win this global war on terrorism. We need the support of Congress and the other services to achieve improved deployment platforms while maintaining the capability we have today.