WORLD WAR II NCOs

Army, Feb 2005 by Collins, John M

Inept personnel management and incompetent training took a terrible toll on the Army's NCO corps for the first two years after the United States entered World War II. Stateside inspection reports reproached "hesitant, uncertain leadership by platoon and squad leaders." A young lieutenant general named Eisenhower deplored the effectiveness of junior leaders earmarked to invade North Africa. Commanders in Italy and the South Pacific noted similar shortcomings until February 1944, when Gen. Marshall told Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson that "the outstanding deficiency currently noted in our divisions is the number of noncommissioned officers who are below standards of intelligence and qualities of leadership."

Major policy reappraisals that belatedly revitalized the NCO corps created and maintained a sharp cutting edge soon thereafter. Thank God they finally saw the light, because the invasion of Fortress Europe lay just ahead.

Axes hit the Army Specialized Training Program first, after Gen. Marshall threatened to deactivate 10 divisions, three tank battalions and 26 antiaircraft battalions if ASTP deferments remained intact. The Secretary of War, on April Fools' Day 1944, accordingly lopped off nearly 80 percent, which returned 120,000 student-soldiers to active duty. Survivors were mainly would-be doctors and dentists destined for the short-handed Medical Corps. Approximately 30,000 surplus aviation cadets forsook the wild blue yonder for foxholes; 40,000 high-quality Army Air Force enlisted men followed.

Most reshuffles proceeded smoothly, but unforeseen side effects temporarily accompanied the transfer of 25,000 chevron-wearing 3rd-, 4th- and 5th-class technicians from Army service forces to ground-gaining arms. Their arrival clogged promotion lists until regulations recognized that "occasions will arise when noncommissioned officers must be reduced in grade [to suit] assignments commensurate with their ability." Unit commanders thereafter stripped stripes from incompetent contenders so all concerned could compete on an even footing for positions that corresponded to their ratings.

No one knows how many fathers, brothers, husbands and sons rest eternally in military cemeteries because U.S. Army policies, programs and procedures produced inept noncoms during the early stages of World War II but, by inference, the number is great. Fortunately, a seasoned, tough, professionally superlative noncommissioned officer corps emerged after 44 months in the crucible and 34 battle streamers on the Army flag. Global strategists set the stage for ultimate victory, but squad leaders traced schemes of maneuver with sticks in mud, gave bone-chilling orders to storm hills that bristled with enemy weapons, then led the way when their men fanned out as skirmishers. Noncommissioned officers in noncombat units furnished essential support.

Army policy makers and planners who provide the current crop of NCOs with superlative preparation-before the shooting starts-clearly learned hard lessons from their World War II predecessors.