Thoughts on the Future Force: A Review

Army,  Aug 2005  by Brown, John S

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Thoughts on the Future Force: A Review

For the last several years the U.S. Army has attempted to transform itself into the force best suited for the 21st century while at the same time taking an active role in the global war on terrorism. In 1999 Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki opined that our Cold War-vintage heavy divisions were too heavy to get anywhere fast enough and our light divisions too light to handle a lethal, capable adversary. Since then Army transformation efforts have pursued a strategically mobile, tactically agile, and incredibly lethal joint force, with the newly deployed Stryker brigades offering a glimpse of what is now possible. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and the intense media coverage they generated have understandably diverted attention from other topics, but useful discussion of defense transformation has continued nevertheless.

In 2003 at least five writers brought out books on the subject: Col. Douglas A. Macgregor with Transformation under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights (Praeger Publishers, $34.95); Maj. Gen. (retired) Robert H. Scales Jr. with Yellow Smoke: The Future of Land Warfare for America's Military (Rowman and Littlefield, $34.95); Bruce Berkowitz with The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century (Free Press, $26); Norman Friedman with Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War (Naval Institute Press, $33.95); and Gen. (retired) Wesley K. Clark with Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire (Public Affairs, $25). Let us briefly examine what each of these authors has said and how well, the extent to which a valid use of history reinforced their arguments, and the degree to which the Army seems mindful of their views in its pursuit of transformation.

Building upon his widely read Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century (Westport, Conn., 1997), Macgregor's Transformation under Fire makes a readable and understandable case for specific reforms. Macgregor articulates his chosen six early on: reorganize the Army from its divisional structure into combat groups; adopt a rotational readiness posture; streamline Army command and control; make U.S. Joint Forces Command the executive agent for all matters pertaining to interoperability; create a new personnel system to support a reorganized, information-age Army; and focus on sustained joint experimentation. In subsequent chapters he makes the case for and explains each of these, arguing that the time for change is now. Although mindful of the promise of further technological advance, Macgregor sees the Army's ills as essentially organizational and argues that the technology necessary for a nimbler, more capable Army is already available. He does not believe that the battlefield picture will ever be perfect, that the fog of war will be banished, or that the precision strike will obviate maneuver. He does believe that specialized, brigade-size combat groups organized either to maneuver, strike, conduct C^sup 4^ISR or sustain, serving in standing joint task forces with which they would train extensively, would radically improve efficiency and effectiveness beyond the level that the divisions of today can achieve. Emphasis should be upon effects, and resources to achieve them should be tailored accordingly, with habitual organizational relationships taking a back seat to desired results. Macgregor's text is a classic example of telling us what he is going to say, saying it, and telling us what he has said. It is well documented and supported by charts, diagrams, and a glossary.

Robert Scales's Yellow Smoke concurs with much of Macgregor's argument. Indeed, Scales wrote the foreword to Transformation under Fire. Yellow Smoke builds its case differently, however, and reaches some distinct conclusions. Scales draws widely on historical episodes from Korea, Vietnam, Kosovo, and Afghanistan to argue that over time, Americans have evolved a firepower-centered style of war predicated on the notion that limited wars should be won at a limited cost in American lives. As head of the Army's Desert Storm assessment team, leader of its Army After Next project, and commandant of the Army War College, Scales certainly has been in a position to observe the discussion, debate, simulations, and exercises that have shaped that evolution recently. In his text he takes us inside some of the analyses and war games in which he participated. After a broad discussion featuring historical assessment, operational analysis, and personal memoir, Scales pulls together a strong final chapter that posits and persuasively explains 10 goals for the future: increase the speed of operational forces; project and maneuver land forces by brigades; maneuver by air at the operational and tactical levels; establish an "unblinking" eye over the battlefield; proliferate precision weaponry and distribute it downward; adopt an operational maneuver doctrine based on firepower dominance and area control; supplement manned with unmanned reconnaissance; maneuver with all arms at the lowest practical level; establish a "band of brothers" approach to selection, training, and readiness; and move beyond jointness to true interdependence of forces. A short book intended as an easy and interesting read, Yellow Smoke is thinly footnoted and lacks charts, diagrams, and maps.