'U.S. ARMY: WE'RE HERE TO HELP'

Army, Nov 2005 by Steele, Dennis

Hurricane Katrina: The New Orleans Aftermath

In often cited one-and-a-half-war or two-and-a-half-war strategic capability scenarios, Hurricane Katrina could be called the half-war. The military deployed more than 50,000 National Guard soldiers, approximately 2,000 reservists and more than 20,000 active duty personnel to stricken areas. Katrina was not a military conflict as expected under the scenarios, and the Army's major weapon during the disaster turned out to be respect-respect for individual soldiers, respect for the Army's institutional competence and American soldiers' respect for their fellow citizens. The second Battle of New Orleans was actually won by handshakes.

Contributing was the Army's emphasis on flexibility, rapid planning and decision making under trying circumstances-essentially, if something doesn't work, try something else until it does-along with a wealth of experience gained during a decade of peacekeeping and nearly four years of full spectrum warfare.

As one soldier quipped while on patrol one day: "When you've taken down Najaf, the French Quarter ain't nothin'."

Some, perhaps much, of what most Americans know about the early situation in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina is a bit skewed. Facts were fabricated from whole cloth by wild rumor and fueled by crowd hysteria, fear, desperation and downright anger. And all of it was magnified by the limitations of the straw-diameter focus of television news reporting. Television news, nonetheless, should be credited with conveying the urgency of the situation and propelling the impetus to bring necessary assistance to the scene. What would have happened if the news crews had not been there?

In many ways, however, the national response once again was driven by the drumbeat of television in both good and bad respects. The upside was that relief got moving; the downside was that it principally went where cameras were pointed, and a situation was created that spiked and fell on the stoking of worst fears, not necessarily worst cases. For example, lawlessness in the form of wanton looting did not occur to the degree portrayed on television, but it seemed to evoke a more immediate response than thirst, hunger or desperation, which was at least as great as it was portrayed.

What should never be downplayed or understated about the situation in New Orleans is the widespread destruction visited upon it by flooding and the suffering of tens of thousands of innocent people and their anguish in seemingly being forgotten by their city, state and nation for days when hours and minutes counted. As time passed, the situations at the Louisiana Superdome and New Orleans Convention Center suffered a melt-down and became a national disgrace.

Nevertheless, many other communities suffered as much or more damage as New Orleans. Along the coast of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, whole towns were utterly swept away. Their post-storm downfall was, and still is to some measure, invisible, not having buzz, 24/7 television coverage, star appearances or spotlight-fueled response. In the only-in-America sense. New Orleans became a hit ongoing reality show, replete with true-life villains, louts, heroes, mobile celebrity circus entourages and helpless people clawing and cussing at the cameras. (And you have to ask yourself what you would do under those circumstances.) New Orleans generated drama on a Shakespearian scale; other places offered only destruction and need.

That, in itself, is part of the sadness of the storm. Roads leading to New Orleans became choked with aid, repair equipment and cheerleaders. The Big Easy, especially its center-of-gravity French Quarter, will be swinging jazz and slinging jambalava again before No-Name-Town, Alabama, Louisiana or Mississippi could see a power crew.

If just the hurricane had hit New Orleans, the city would have fared relatively well, and we would not have heard much about it. Wind and rain damage was in the bounceback range. The flooding was the knockout blow, causing tens of thousands of people to seek refuge at the Superdome or Convention Center, which actually was never planned to serve as a shelter.

New Orleans actually suffered three major disasters in succession: the hurricane, the flooding and the wholesale surfacing of social ills-poverty, crime, gang activity, drug abuse and the like-which had been lurking below the glitter of Mardi Gras' crust for decades. Suddenly, the city's mask dropped, and its faults lay naked. The storm tore down all facades.

To some degree, the ills of New Orleans exist in every large U.S. city, and Karrina could be the model for any future major disaster to strike a large city. The complexities proved to be greater than anything previously conceived.

The experiences from Katrina-and later Hurricane Rita -might lead to increased active duty military involvement in a widened range of domestic crises-perhaps even as the lead agency for the worst of them. That is being debated, and it would mark a significant change for the military.