Mogadishu 1993, Tal Afar 2004 And Army Transformation

Army,  Feb 2007  by Brown, John S

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Advocates of military transformation are often inspired by such historical examples as the introduction of drilled musketry or the development of so-called blitzkrieg warfare. Seeking such inspiration is history well used. We are not too close in time to recognize that a transformation of comparable magnitude has occurred in the last dozen years. A comparison of events on the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, October 3-4,1993, and TaI Afar, Iraq, September 4, 2004, might make the point.

Most readers of this column are probably familiar with the book or movie Black Hawk Down and perhaps with official accounts of that fighting as well. These provide testimony to the courage, tenacity and initiative of the American soldier in trying circumstances. They also describe columns lost in a rabbit warren of streets, unknown friendly locations, unknowable enemy locations, huge difficulties bringing firepower effectively to bear and vehicles overmatched by ubiquitous enemy arms.

Even as our soldiers fought in the dusty streets of Mogadishu, developments were under way changing the battlefield for those to come after them. Digitization, blue force tracking, cheap-and thus generally available-GPS-assisted delivery systems, tactically accessible unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), networked sensors and shooters, reach-back information access, downloadable maps and graphics, radically improved Kevlar body armor and a mix of personal equipment improvements were en route to practical application. A few years later, the Stryker combat vehicle, a precursor to the FCX, would be en route as well.

Soldiers of the Stryker-borne 5-20th Infantry had their "Mogadishu moment" when an OH-58D helicopter went down hard in the urban sprawl of TaI Afar. The pilots, although injured, escaped the wreckage and crawled to the relative safety of a nearby rock wall. Our adversaries seem to have been as familiar with Mogadishu precedents as we were, and a race developed between those trying to prevent another "Black Hawk Down" and those trying to reproduce one.

The first combatants on the scene were the 5-20th's Scout Platoon. The OH-58D's icon had remained visible on their FBCB^sup 2^, so they knew where it was. Scalable electronic downloadable maps gave them an exact appreciation of the geography, GPS an exact appreciation of their own positions and blue force tracking the locations of friendly vehicles. As they raced through the streets, a potpourri of munitions ricocheted harmlessly off the armor of the wheel-borne Strykers. They knew where they were going and how to get there-and they got there first.

The Scouts had not won the race by much, as steadily increasing volumes of fire into their hasty positions around the helicopter attested. More troubling, UAVs flying above their positions downloaded imagery depicting a rapid enemy buildup, including insurgents unloading rocket-propelled grenades and machine guns from civilian vehicles. A relief column, Company B of the 5-20th Infantry, was churning its way through the dusty streets towards them, and the ever more numerous insurgents divided their attention between attempts to overwhelm the isolated platoon and to set up blocking positions to delay the relieving company. The blocking positions did not last long. After quick coordination between Company B and their joint tactical air controller, they disappeared in dirt plumes raised by GBU-31 bombs precisely laid by F-16 fighter-bombers that had scrambled overhead. Company B rolled on unmolested, ignoring residual small arms fire.

As Company B arrived at the helicopter crash site, the soldiers who clattered out of the back of each Stryker bore a formidable panoply: Kevlar body armor, laser designators, single-channel ground and airborne radio system radios (SINCGARS), rapid fielding initiative accoutrements, a mix of automatic weapons and lots of ammunition. The insurgents tried to overwhelm the now reinforced position. This was a mistake. Hurricanes of well-aimed fire swept them off the roof tops, out of the streets and ultimately out of surrounding buildings room by room. Americans were hit, but Kevlar body armor minimized the damage done.

With the coolness of troops who completely dominate their battlefield, the Americans now brought forward a HEMTT (heavy expanded mobility tactical truck) wrecker and a palletized load system flatbed truck. This recovery team sawed off the helicopter blades and loaded the wreckage onto the flatbed, and then the entire contingent disengaged by stages and drove away. There would be no bodies dragged through the streets, no hostages, no captured materials, no pictures of jubilant insurgents dancing on a helicopter.

As capable as the leaders of the 5-20th Infantry certainly were, success at TaI Afar did not originate with them alone. The revolutionary technologies they so ably demonstrated had been a generation in the making and progressively fielded in the last dozen years. Too often our Army is depicted as the brontosaurus, too stupid to recognize a need for change and committing its voracious appetite to self-preservation alone. In fact, the Army is designed to reengineer itself continuously. Talented officers staff agencies explicitly mandated to forecast future needs, anticipate future technologies and design future victories. At the higher levels, these ally with defense contractors, who can be patriots as well as businessmen, and political leaders who can be conscientious as well as vote-conscious. Whatever one's opinion of the so-called military-industrial complex, it has put extraordinary capabilities in the hands of our soldiers.