Transformation and Transition

Army,  Mar 2008  by Kroesen, Frederick J

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The word transformation has been in our lexicon for a few years now. Three Army Chiefs of Staff have used the term to describe changes in force structure, doctrine, technique and materiel as the Army evolves into the future. It is change already under way, and it is change that must continue at least at its current pace-preferably even more rapidly.

The continuity of the process will be dependent to a great degree on the related practice termed transition. A year from now, no matter who wins the election in November, we will have a new government. The new President will have a transition team recommending new secretaries for cabinet positions among other political appointees. The new administration will speak of new initiatives and new directions, but the government, in large measure, will mark time for months while those new ideas are formulated and action is directed.

Congress, probably beginning at least in early summer, will be consumed until November with the need to be reelected, then will organize itself to also mark time until the new administration begins to function-this despite the probability that more than 90 percent of the incumbents who desire reelection will be returning. They will be aware of the legislative challenges but hesitant about acting until the new programs are developed. All of which portends a year-long hiatus that must be prepared for between January and July of this year.

The Army's fiscal year 2008 budget does not provide for all known requirements: supplemental funding for the costs of war, unfulfilled requirements for Base Realignment and Closure execution and the unforeseen demands for funding initiatives developed since the budget request was prepared. Funding for the mine resistant ambush protected vehicle in 2007 is an example of an unforeseen cost for last year's budget.

Our Chief of Staff, Gen. George W. casey Jr., has expressed very well the continuing needs of the existing Army. His four imperatives-sustain, prepare, reset and transform-set the parameters for sustaining that which is authorized in the 2008 program and budget, even including the modest increase in the end strength of the active force. Requirements for continuing the wartime operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are identified in the request for supplemental funds. The need for consistency and continuity of these programs is an absolute demand that Congress must be aware of, perhaps reminded of periodically.

What is also necessary during the transition period is an understanding of the long-term restoration of the Army's two-war capabilities, the abUity to respond across the full spectrum of warfare. Gen. Casey's authorizations aUow him to plan to reduce the 15-month combat tour to 12 months, followed by at least 12 months dwell time in the continental United States for the active force and perhaps 36 months for Reservists. While that will be progress, it will be a long way short of the desired wartime objectives of 24 months of dwell time for the active and 60 months for the reserve component forces. Even those objectives are well short of a force that can be considered career attractive. I predict that telling a new recruit or ROTC graduate that he will be gone for 10 years during a 30-year career will not be favored information in a recruiting effort.

Then there are the demands on a force capable of responding to multiple contingencies, a second theater of war, an unforetold international crisis that requires a military response. The growth of a peer competitor is not an improbability. Whatever the ultimate size and resource requirements of the Army, the need must be clearly and consistently expressed during the period of transition and the new government apprised in convincing detail. We need Future Combat Systems, a revamped aviation fleet, secure and protected communications, continued evolution of the combat warrior requirements and the adoption of currently unknown inventions that will continue our battlefield dominance. Only a clear, consistent expression of such needs will combat the next demand for a peace dividend; reductions tied to the withdrawal of forces from combat; the stretch-out of research, development and acquisition; an "improved" toothto-tail ratio; and "better" management by smaller headquarters. New governments have "new" ideas that they will not know we have fried and found wanting in the past unless we educate them early about the soundness of Army needs and plans.

By Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen

U.S. Army retired

GEN. FREDERICK J. Ret., is a former commander in chief of U.S. Army Europe and a senior fellow of AUSA's Institute of Land Warfare.

Copyright Association of the United States Army Mar 2008
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