Army: Roles and Missions: The Army Reserve at the Crossroads

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Roles and Missions: The Army Reserve at the Crossroads

Howard, Gary C

In every war, the Army adapts to the threat. Some adaptations work well. Others must be reexamined and refined. One of the most radical changes in recent years has been to redefine the mission of the Army Reserve from its traditional role as a strategic reserve to a new role as an operational reserve. To facilitate this change, the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF) force management model is being implemented. The model will enable the Army Reserve to fulfill its responsibilities to the nation's defense in a way that supports the individual Reservist.

Or will it? Several critical practical issues remain to be resolved. Initial indicators are mixed, and success is not guaranteed.

The AREF model significantly changes the organization of the Army Reserve and rewrites the contract between individual Reservists and the Army. Traditionally, the Army Reserve prepared for infrequent but critical mobilizations. Training one weekend each month and about two weeks each year maintained reasonable competence. Postmobilization training brought units to the level required for deployment.

In contrast, the AREF prepares units for possible regular activations. Most Reserve units will be assigned to one of 10 AREF packages, and two of those packages will be ready for activation each year. Under the AREF, most units will be on a 5-year fraining cycle. Year 1 will focus on training individual skills, year 2 on small-unit collective training and team building, and year 3 on unit collective tasks. In year 4, units will go to the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif., or the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, La., to validate their skills, so they are ready to deploy, if needed, in year 5. Then the cycle begins again.

The goals of the AREF are twofold. First, it will provide the Army with an adequate force. Second, although there are no guarantees, Reservists should have a better idea when they are likely to be activated and will be better able to plan their civilian careers and home lives.

For the AREF to be successful, it will have to overcome several challenges. First, retention has long been (and remains) a significant issue in Army Reserve units. Units typically lose about 25 percent of their strength each year. In recent years, to maintain end strength, both the Army Reserve and the active Army have dramatically increased bonuses; raised upper age limits; reduced standards for high school diplomas, crime records and drug use; and retasked a large portion of the full-time unit support to recruiting and retention. Second, the geographic distribution of Reserve units exacerbates this problem. While active component units simply move soldiers into unit vacancies anywhere, Reserve units have been ruled by Reservists who live within commuting distance. This limitation has made it very difficult to fill units to required strength with qualified soldiers and often requires extensive cross-leveling during activations. Finally, the funding needed for training and equipment under AREF, while still less than that for the active component, is considerably greater than under the traditional system.

Even so, the AREF could overcome these challenges. The geography problem might be mitigated by rethinking the definition of a unit, by paying Reservists to travel to drill or by changing training strategies. Notably, the first four years of the cycle focus more on individuals than on units. Units only have to be at strength in the years 4 and 5 of the cycle. Thus, the intensive training to bring a unit to standard will occur before activation rather than after it, as in the traditional model.

The most critical challenge, however, is a new one, and it relates to the very definition of an operational reserve. Will the predictability promised by the AREF model offset concerns of repeated deployments for a sufficient number of Reservists?

Deployments are hard on all soldiers, but they are particularly hard on Reservists. Most Reservists do not live near an active installation, and they lack many of the support systems commonly available to active component soldiers and their families. Furthermore, although civilian employers have been reasonably cooperative, will they still support Reservists who might have to leave for one year in every five?

Imagine the situation in reverse. An active component officer has just been promoted to lieutenant colonel. He has been selected for battalion command and hopes for a slot at a resident senior service school. But suddenly he is deactivated for a year and must leave the Army for a civilian job.

So far, Reservists have responded extraordinarily well to deployments. But in the free-market environment of an all-volunteer Army, the choice to join or remain in the Army Reserve hinges on many factors. Patriotism, educational benefits, training, pay and prestige will all be balanced against activations, deployments and other demands. Increased recruiting and retention bonuses for enlisted soldiers, expanded educational benefits, better access to TRICARE and other enticements will be weighed against family obligations and civilian career opportunities. Last year, Lt. Col. Tracy Thompson carefully examined many of these factors in an excellent Army War College study, "Untested Waters: Challenges Facing an Operational Reserve" (March 2007).

As units and soldiers are deployed for a second or third time, how will Reservists, many of whom have had challenges balancing their civilian and military careers already, weigh these factors? By joining the Army Reserve rather than the active Army, most Reservists opted for a part-time military career. In Citizen Warriors (1997), written well before the Iraq and Afghanistan operations, Stephen M. Duncan noted, "At some point, the high-quality Reservists whose skills and experience make them the seed corn for future combat leadership will reluctantly but inevitably conclude that they simply don't have enough time to remain in the armed forces and to adequately fulfill commitments to their civilian careers, to their families, and to educational and other private needs."

The indicators right now are mixed. The Army Reserve made its annual missions for recruiting and retention. However, AUSA News (January 2008) reports that reemployment problems for returning Reservists are increasing rapidly. Some observers have suggested that the increased retention numbers reflect the tax-free nature of bonuses for deployed Reservists and previous personnel rotation policies that limited follow-on deployments.

All of this discussion begs a fundamental question: What is the proper role for the Army Reserve? Is it better suited for an operational mission or its traditional strategic role?

Some number of Reservists will always be able to answer the call. But will there be enough? The Army Reserve and Army National Guard have been a national insurance policy. We call on them in times of crisis. Like any insurance policy, the premiums can be raised or the policy can be cancelled. In the last 20 years, the Army Reserve has been most needed in two missions: Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In these two cases, the Army needed very large numbers of Reservists. The AREF model would not have produced that required number of Reserve soldiers without breaking the system.

In the end, it may not matter. Several factors are likely to mitigate the effects of the new strategy on the Army Reserve. First, given the current overextended state of the U.S. military, any new presidential administration will have fewer military options. Second, the ongoing expansion of the active component will reduce the need for reserve component augmentation. Finally, the rebalancing of the forces between the reserve and active components has been suggested and, if ever implemented, might reduce the demand for quick deployments of Reserve forces.

Reservists bring extraordinary and cost-effective benefit to the nation's defense. We need to make sure we preserve this precious resource. The step in that effort is to make sure the Army Reserve has the proper mission.

By Col. Gary C. Howard

U.S. Army Reserve retired

COL. GARY C. HOWARD, USAR Ret., was commander of the 1397th Transportation Terminal Brigade at Mare Island, Calif. During his Army Reserve career he served in command and staff assignments in 10 units in four states. A graduate of the Command and General Staff College, Col. Howard has a Ph.D. in biological sciences from Carnegie Mellon University.