If we lose hearts and minds, we will lose the war

Spectator, The, May 23, 2009 by Kilcullen, David

David Kilcullen, the man who helped think up the strategy that saved Iraq, says that high-tech weaponry is not the answer in Afghanistan. Only a genuine partnership with the people can help us win

Sir Olaf Caroe - a legendary figure of the Raj, ethnographer of the Pashtuns and last administrator of the North-West Frontier of British India - wrote in 1958 that 'unlike other wars, Afghan wars become serious only when they are over; in British times at least they were apt to produce an after-crop of tribal unrest [and] constant intrigue among the border tribes.' Western leaders would have been wise to consider his words after the 'stunning defeat' of the Taleban, whose ramshackle theocratic tyranny crumbled in less than ten weeks' fighting after 9/11.

On 7 December 2001, as the last Taleban stronghold fell at Kandahar, only 110 CIA and a few hundred Special Forces officers were inside Afghanistan. Donald Rumsfeld mused that this lightning success by an elite ground force, operating under a high-tech umbrella of precision airpower, space-based surveillance and satellite communications, heralded a 'transformation' that would remake the rules of war. General Tommy Franks exulted that 'information dominance' - omniscience through pervasive real-time intelligence - had given him 'the kind of Olympian perspective that Homer had given his gods'. Afghanistan, graveyard of the Soviet empire and bugbear to the British, Mughals, Persians and Macedonians, had proven almost too easy to conquer, thanks to the sheer brilliance of Western political leaders, the raw talent of our fighting men and the wizardry of our weapons.

Well, not quite. It turns out that old Olaf was closer to the mark.

After a two-year lull the Taleban returned with a vengeance, escalating their insurgency and threatening the security of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Tribal unrest, extremist brutality and terrorist violence have soared, coalition resolve is faltering and local governments seem unable, or unwilling, to deal with the threat. There have been signs, in recent days, that the Pentagon understands the urgent need for a new approach to Afghanistan. Lieutenant General Stanley A.

McChrystal, the new American commander in Afghanistan, had his first meeting with President Obama on Tuesday this week and his appointment at least signifies a desire to move away from conventional warfare to the sort of counter-insurgency thinking that was so successful in Iraq. But Pentagon officials have also indicated drone strikes are to be a significant part of any new approach, and drones are not the answer.

The key to winning this most crucial war is not an increase in attacks or a greater focus on 'bounty-hunting' - the bringing in of so called 'high-value' targets. Though killing terrorists is no bad thing in itself, the only real solution involves engaging indigenous forces - the Afghan people - to help us help them liberate their country.

Since 2006, I have talked with many locals in Afghanistan: tribal elders, government officials, police and soldiers, Taleban defectors, religious leaders, educated intellectuals and ordinary people in the valleys and villages.

None has ever called 2001 an 'invasion'. They remember, as we sometimes forget, that the key to victory in 2001 was not Western technology, but the Afghan people.

Afghans hated the Taleban - even today, only 4 per cent want them back - and the tiny coalition force joined an existing alliance of anti-Taleban Pashtuns and northern ethnic groups that had 50,000 fighters in the field by the fall of Kandahar. This, not high-tech weaponry, was the source of success. Victory was achieved by a genuine partnership with Afghans who rejected the Taleban and joined in the struggle for freedom.

Afghan support remains our most important asset. If you're at all sceptical about this, just consider the recent polls: 63 per cent of Afghans surveyed wanted coalition troops to stay, while 82 per cent wanted the current government to continue ruling Afghanistan.

Around 49 per cent rated the government's performance as good or excellent, while 52 per cent thought President Karzai was doing a good or excellent job. For comparison, Barack Obama's approval rating in the United States was 63 per cent last week.

So, the 'graveyard of empires' argument does not apply: the Russians, the British and others never had the Afghan support we enjoy. Partly, of course, this is because Afghans know we seek no empire - on the contrary, the coalition of 38 nations in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has always intended to disengage as soon as possible. Indeed, our most egregious errors have arisen from attempts to hand off responsibilities too early, rather than hanging on to them too long.

For the last two years we've been scandalously neglectful of our indigenous allies, so Afghan enthusiasm for our war has been dropping off. Back in 2006, support for the coalition was around 85 per cent. Rebuilding our partnership with the Afghan people must be our main objective in the campaign.