"five Rs" of Army integration and the crucial element, The

National Guard, Jun 1999 by Navas, William A Jr

By Maj. Gen. William A. Navas Jr (et. Much has been said, written and done during the past year about the issue of Active Army and Army National Guard integration initiatives.

These range from the Secretary of Defense's mandate to remove existing barriers to integration, sharing command billets, establishing mutually agreed requirements on which to base resource allocation decisions, to actually standing up two new Army/National Guard integrated divisions. Today we also see a very positive trend in attitudes between both components and willingness inside the Army family to "bury the hatchet" and march forward as "One Team, One Fight, One Future" into the 21st Century.

This is a welcome relief from the nadir of component relations during the turbulent days in the summer of 1997 the wake of the Quadrennial Defense Review, which was the comprehensive study of the nation's defense needs. The only way to affect change is by altering habits and mores, starting with behavior modification. For large organizations, like the Army, that means changing policies, structure and establishing clearly understood and accepted rules, roles, relationships, responsibilities, and the expected results - the "Five Rs."

The interaction among three individuals in positions who are charged with making this delicate enterprise work are the secretary of the army, the Army chief of staff and the National Guard Bureau chief. They must base their decisions on our founding fathers' intentions, the Constitution and the challenges and opportunities of the present. This relationship is the crucial element to honest, effective and enduring integration.

The way these leaders perceive and carry out their roles and responsibilities will have a significant impact on the policies, decisions and actions taken by the rest of the Army. True integration must start at the top. We are at a point where great things can be accomplished by mutual trust and understanding of each others' roles.

The Army and Air Force secretaries each have responsibilities under both Tide 10 and Title 32. Title 10 provides policy guidance and authority to the secretary - who is appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate - with respect to the Army and its reserve components. Title 32 provides additional policy guidance and authority specific to administering, equipping and training members and units of the National Guard when they are not in active federal status. The secretary delegates some Title 10 responsibilities to the Army chief of staff and some Title 32 responsibilities to the NGB chief.

Also appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, the Army chief is selected based on senior leaders' recommendations and serves as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The bureau chief, who is principal Guard advisor to the Army and Air Force secretaries, is appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. The governors and the District of Columbia National Guard commanding general nominate him.

The resulting structure is a troika established by law, regulations and customs coming together from diverse backgrounds and is charged with making the Total Army Policy work. We must clarity the rules, roles, relationships and responsibilities of each and every member if we are to achieve the desired result of an integrated Army.

The Army chief is a "four star" general and the senior officer of his service. As the position pertains to policy issues regarding the Army National Guard, he is on an equal level to the NGB chief a "three star" general. The NGB chief represents the governors, who are the commander's in chief, as the channel of communications between the states and the Department of the Army The Army chief of staff and the NGB chief work for the same boss, the secretary of Army.

In cases where there are policy differences, the secretary serves as the final authority, since it is he who has the Tide 10 and 32 responsibilities. If these three individuals recognize their roles, relationships and responsibilities then the pertinent rules of the game can be established to attain the (result) goal of "One Team, One Fight, One Future."

When this delicate balance is ignored and policy issues are decided without the active participation of these three essential players, the results can be disastrous. An example: the QDR where many policy issues dealing with missions and force structure decisions regarding the Army National Guard were not discussed and decided by that "group of three." Most of the debate and decisions took place at the Joint Staff level, where only the Army chief has a seat, and Department of Defense level with questionable participation from the Army Secretariat and the National Guard Bureau. This led to the direct intervention of the governors with the secretary of defense taking the dialogue and decisions away from the Army and exacerbating already strained relationships.

Today we have a golden opportunity to leam from past mistakes. A new chief of staff will be sworn in this month. We have a secretary and a bureau chief relatively new to their positions. The "timing" is perfect for them to spend some time together and develop their strategy using the Five Rs, to attain the vision of a Total Army.