TUG OF WAR: THE SUPREME COURT, CONGRESS, AND THE CIRCUITS-THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S INPUT ON THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE A PRISONER'S RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN ADKINS V. KASPAR

St. John's Law Review, Fall 2006 by Budzenski, Scott

INTRODUCTION

Religious freedom is arguably the most important fundamental right guaranteed to the American people by the framers of the United States Constitution.1 Freedom from and freedom of religion were so important to our founding fathers that they warranted inclusion in the first two clauses of the Bill of Rights.2 When national legislation implicates these basic rights, it is of the utmost importance to determine the precise scope of the law's impact.3 These basic rights are clearly guaranteed, not only to every member of our free society, but to incarcerated criminals as well.4 Although incarcerated criminals experience some limitation of rights, they are still United States citizens and are thus protected by the Constitution.5 Congress has recognized this irrefutable fact and has sought to ensure protection of prisoners' religious rights in the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA").6 The RLUIPA declares that "[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution."7 Because Congress opted not to define what government conduct would qualify as a "substantial burden," this attempt to protect prisoners' religious rights was left largely to judicial interpretation.8 Circuit courts across the country have disagreed as to what constitutes a "substantial burden" within the meaning of the RLUIPA, but the United States Supreme Court has declined to address the issue.9 Recently, in Adkins v. Kaspar,10 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit added its interpretation of "substantial burden" under the RLUIPA to the already unworkable list of definitions employed by courts across the country.11 In affirming the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs RLUIPA claim, the Fifth Circuit held that "a government action or regulation does not rise to the level of a substantial burden on religious exercise if it merely prevents the adherent from either enjoying some benefit that is not otherwise generally available or acting in a way that is not otherwise generally allowed."12 Because of the importance of the fundamental right to religion, it is imperative that the Supreme Court settle this dispute among the circuits and declare a uniform standard for the lower courts to follow.13 The plaintiffs petition for certiorari in Adkins gave the Court the ability to speak on the issue and provide the circuits with much needed guidance.14 In denying certiorari, the Court not only condemned one man's quest for religious freedom, but also left all prisoners' religious rights in a precarious position.16

The plaintiff in Adkins was a prisoner of the State of Texas, incarcerated at the Coffield Prison, and a practicing member of the Yahweh Evangelical Assembly ('TEA").16 Plaintiffs YEA religion required that he observe certain days of rest and worship, including each Saturday, for the Sabbath, as well as other specified holy days.17 According to the YEA faith, the plaintiff and his fellow adherents were required to assemble and worship together, in congregation, on each of those particular days.18 Nevertheless, as an inmate at Coffield, the plaintiff was prevented from adhering to these religious precepts due to the requirements of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's ("TDCJ") religious accommodation policy.19 Under the TDCJ policy, religious assembly and congregation were not permitted unless an accredited outside world religious volunteer was present.20 Because a qualified YEA volunteer only visited Coffield once a month, the plaintiff was denied the ability to adhere to his religious requirements at least three times per month.21 It is important to point out, however, that Muslims at Coffield were apparently exempt from the TDCJ policy; Muslims were regularly permitted to assemble in congregation without an accredited outside world religious volunteer being present.22

Plaintiff brought suit in federal court claiming, among other things, that his rights were violated under the RLUIPA.23 The matter was referred to a magistrate judge who recommended dismissal after conducting an evidentiary hearing.24 The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and dismissed the plaintiffs case.26 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal,26 and the Supreme Court subsequently denied the plaintiffs petition for a writ of certiorari.27

On appeal, plaintiff renewed his RLUIPA claim contending that his rights under the Act were violated.28 Plaintiff argued that the defendants imposed a substantial burden on his religious exercise without demonstrating that the burden was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest.29 In rejecting his RLUIPA claim, the Fifth Circuit began its analysis by explaining that the plaintiff must first demonstrate that the government imposed a "substantial burden" on his "religious exercise."30 To determine whether the plaintiff met this requirement, the court explained that it would make two inquiries:31 (1) whether the burdened activity qualifies as "religious exercise"; and (2) whether this burden is "substantial."32 Pointing out that the RLUIPA defines "religious exercise" as "any exercise of religion," the court found that "[t]he activities alleged to be burdened in this case-YEA Sabbath and holy day gatherings-easily qualify as 'religious exercise' under the RLUIPAD[]...."33