"WE EXPRESS NO VIEW ON THIS ISSUE": THE STANDARD OF PROOF FOR THE ELEMENT OF FALSITY IN A NEW YORK PUBLIC OFFICIAL/FIGURE DEFAMATION ACTION

St. John's Law Review, Winter 2007 by Weininger, Daniel William

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the decision of the panel's majority.96 A plurality of the Court sided with Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion, which held that the New York Times actual malice standard must be applied to public figures.97 The concurrence reasoned that an arbitrary differentiation in the standards applied to public officials and public figures would "have no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy."98 The Chief Justice feared that treating public officials and public figures differently would confuse juries and lead to improper verdicts.99 More importantly, Warren predicted that the increasing influence of private sector interests in the formulation of policy decisions and economic planning would make it increasingly difficult for the courts to discern who constituted a public official or figure.100 As the Chief Justice stated, "[A]lthough [public figures] are not subject to the restraints of the political process, 'public figures,' like 'public officials,' often play an influential role in ordering society."101 Consequently, their quasi-public roles in society create an unbridled power that can only be checked by the press.102 The New York Times standard accomplished this goal and provided a practical approach103 that balanced the "proper degree [of] legitimate interests traditionally protected by the law of defamation."104

B. Private Persons

The dominance of the actual malice standard in American defamation law appeared to reach its pinnacle when the Court held that it applied to defamatory statements concerning private individuals on matters of public concern.105 In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,WG after the police arrested petitioner Rosenbloom for possession of obscene material, the respondent radio station broadcast a news report stating that he was a "smut peddler."107 The trial court acquitted Rosenbloom of the charges after it determined that the materials were not obscene.108 He then brought a libel claim against the radio station.109 Writing for the Court once again, Justice Brennan required that the plaintiff prove actual malice because Rosenbloom's activities constituted a public matter, irrespective of his stature as a private person.110 "The community has a vital interest in the proper enforcement of its criminal laws," stated Justice Brennan, "particularly in an area such as obscenity [,] where a number of highly important values are potentially in conflict."111 As a result, the Court "extend[ed] constitutional protection to all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous."112 The Rosenbloom Court overextended the reach of the actual malice standard. By affording even greater constitutional protections to the media at the expense of private persons' reputations, the Court shifted its "emphasis from the status of the plaintiff (the public official in Times) to the nature of the underlying issue involved (public interest in criminal activity in Rosenbloom)."113 The Court's ruling unabashedly amalgamated the public official, the public figure, and the private person involved in a matter of public concern.114 All three classes of plaintiffs would now have to incorporate the element of actual malice in their standard pleadings.115