DWINDLING CLASS OF "DISABLED INDIVIDUALS": AN EXEMPLIFICATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT'S INADEQUACIES IN D'ANGELO V. CONAGRA FOODS, INC., THE

St. John's Law Review, Winter 2007 by Egan, Daniel

INTRODUCTION

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA")1 sought to eliminate discrimination in the workplace against individuals with disabilities by creating clear and consistent standards of protection for deserving employees.2 Unfortunately, for the fiftyfour million Americans living with a disability,3 no such standard was ever created, and the courts seem perplexed as to who is included in the ADA's protected class. The statutory language Congress used in enacting the ADA has produced several significant hurdles-for what should otherwise be deserving employees-in qualifying for protection under the ADA. There has been significant disparity among federal circuits in interpreting the scope of the ADA's protection, particularly in defining "disability,"4 rendering numerous impaired employees without an adequate remedy and depriving them of equality of opportunity and economic self-sufficiency.5 The federal circuits' inability to reach a consensus as to the scope of the ADA's protective umbrella has bred uncertainty within the employer/employee relationship concerning what measures must be taken by an employer, if any, to accommodate a disabled employee.6

Recently, in D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,7 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that individuals who are "regarded as disabled"-rather than being disabled in the actual impairment sense-are entitled to reasonable accommodations under the ADA.8 The court, however, ultimately held that the plaintiff still failed to qualify for the ADA's protection as to her actual impairment claim, because her vertigo condition "[did] not substantially impair her ability to perform the major life function of working."9

As stated above, the D'Angelo plaintiff suffered from vertigo, alleging that she had been terminated from her job at ConAgra Foods, Inc. ("ConAgra") on the basis of this disability.10 The plaintiff was diagnosed with vertigo prior to her commencement of work at ConAgra, and within several months of employment began to experience symptoms while at the workplace.11 The plaintiff informed her co-workers and supervisor that she was experiencing dizziness and nausea, attributing these feelings to her vertigo condition.12 She also explained to her supervisor that she only experienced these symptoms when performing a task requiring her to stare continuously at a conveyor belt.13 The plaintiff provided the plant manager with a note from her doctor stating that she suffered from a vertigo condition and should therefore avoid staring at moving objects such as conveyor belts.14 Subsequently, the plant manager met with the Vice President of Human Resources, and they determined that there were no positions available at ConAgra that would accommodate the plaintiffs condition; she was terminated the following day.15 ConAgra was aware that the plaintiff was positively qualified to work a number of different positions,16 and that she only complained of dizziness and sickness when required to stare continuously at a conveyor belt-conduct which was not a necessary function of many of the positions that plaintiff was adept at working.17

At trial, the plaintiff made two claims: (1) that she was entitled to reasonable accommodations under the ADA because she suffered from an actual physical impairment substantially limiting her in a major life activity; and (2) that she was entitled to reasonable accommodations under the ADA because her employer regarded her as having such an impairment.18 The district court granted summary judgment for ConAgra on both issues. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the plaintiffs first contention, affirming summary judgment for ConAgra on her actual impairment claim.19 The court reasoned that, because the plaintiff failed to show that she was substantially limited in the major life activity of working, she was not disabled in the actual impairment sense.20 As to her "regarded as" claim, the circuit court found that genuine issues of material fact precluded finding summary judgment for ConAgra, and remanded the case back to district court.21 In its discussion, the Eleventh Circuit reached a significant conclusion by embracing the Third Circuit's stance that individuals regarded as disabled are entitled to protection under the ADA.22

The dissent in D'Angelo viewed this as a "failure to communicate" case.23 ConAgra was under the impression that the plaintiffs vertigo prevented her from working around any moving equipment, and thus terminated her because it believed that there was no area of the plant where she could be suitably accommodated.24 Had ConAgra simply consulted with the plaintiff after learning of her impairment, it would have become conscious of the true extent of the limitations inherent in her condition. Working around just any moving equipment did not cause the onset of the plaintiffs vertigo; her sole complaint was working on the spreader belt.25 While the dissenting judge acknowledged this significant lapse in communication, he ultimately concluded that ConAgra was justified in terminating the plaintiff, "based upon [its] opinion that she was not qualified to work in [its] plant."26