Disabled ADA: How a Narrowing ADA Threatens To Exclude the Cognitively Disabled, The

Brigham Young University Law Review, 2006 by Catchpole, Nathan, Miller, Aaron

To be clear, Congress never directly explained its use of "substantially" in relation to any other adverb it could have chosen to modify "limits." Therefore, while the foregoing analysis comports with the plain meaning of the ADA's provisions and stated purposes, courts narrowly interpreting the ADA cannot be seen as brazenly disregarding legislative guidance. Nevertheless, Congress clearly intended the ADA to open up employment and social opportunities to a broad class of persons with disability-induced limitations, and courts should not be entirely excused from interpreting the ADA's coverage terms in contravention of its purposes.

D. The Prudent Floor of "Substantial Limitation"

Even beyond the ADA's plain language and legislative history, which read together suggest an inclusive interpretation of the statute, the Supreme Court too has interpreted "substantial limitation" in an inclusive manner, effectively characterizing "substantial limitation" as a prudent coverage floor rather than an exacting coverage high bar. In Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, a truck driver with monocular vision who had been mistakenly certified as fit to drive was fired after a company physical revealed his condition.78 The driver, Kirkingburg, ultimately received a U.S. Department of Transportation waiver, but Albertson's refused to rehire him, leading him to sue Albertson's for violation of the ADA.79

The district court granted summary judgment for Albertson's, ruling that Kirkingburg did not qualify for ADA protection because he was not qualified to drive a truck without an accommodation.80 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, addressing Albertson's new argument that Kirkingburg was not "disabled" under the ADA, reversed, concluding that Kirkingburg "had presented 'uncontroverted evidence' that his vision" -"seeing" being a major life activity42 "was effectively monocular," meaning that "he had demonstrated that 'the manner in which he sees differs significantly from the manner in which most people see.'"83 Put another way, the Ninth Circuit held that a difference in manner of sight was sufficient to establish Kirkingburg as disabled under the ADA.84

Addressing this issue, the Supreme Court noted that the Ninth Circuit had rightly looked to whether Kirkingburg's monocular vision "[significantly restrict[ed him] as to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity"85 but was nevertheless incorrect in applying the legal standard because it had relied on the fact that "the manner in which [Kirkingburg] sees differs significantly from the manner in which most people see."86 Criticizing the Ninth Circuit's holding as equating a "mere difference" in seeing with a "significant restriction" in seeing,87 the Court explained, "By transforming 'significant restriction' into 'difference,' the [Ninth Circuit] undercut the fundamental [ADA] requirement that only impairments causing 'substantial limitations]' in individuals' ability to perform major life activities constitute disabilities."88 The Court reasoned that Kirkingburg's body could have learned to mitigate the difficulty of monocular vision to the point that he was no longer significantly restricted in his seeing relative to others.89 To find Kirkingburg "disabled" under these circumstances, the Court concluded, would be to elevate the condition of monocular vision to the level of per se disability, regardless of how his condition actually affected him, which would contravene the ADA's express mandate to determine disability "with respect to an individual."90