"Manifest" Destiny?: How Some Courts Have Fallaciously Come To Require a Greater Showing of Congressional Intent for Jurisdictional Exhaustion Than They Require for Preemption

Brigham Young University Law Review, 2008 by Miller, Colin

In Uniroyal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the question of whether "section 503 pre-empt[ed] a qualified handicapped individual's claim under state law as a third party beneficiary of the affirmative action clause contained in contracts between his employer and the federal government . . . .,,i4 When considering whether the federal interests involved dominated the relevant state interests,35 the court found "that the federal interest expressed by section 503 lies at least in the interest of the federal government in determining with whom and on what conditions it will contract."36 The Eleventh Circuit also found that "Congress has expressed an interest in section 503 in promoting a 'consistent, uniform and effective Federal approach' to breaches of the government's contracts with private contractors."37 The court then noted the plaintiff's countervailing contention "that any interest of the federal government [was] far outweighed by the magnitude of the state's traditional interest in preserving the sanctity of contracts and binding parties to the terms of their agreements."38

Additionally, "even if Congress has not occupied the field, state law is naturally preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute."39 Conflict preemption exists "where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility ... or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."40 Conflict preemption has been found in cases ranging from administrative orders41 to statutory sanctions.42

In determining whether Congress has impliedly preempted state and local laws through field or conflict preemption, "courts have unhesitatingly given weight to the purpose, structure, and legislative history of the statute" at issue.43 Before proceeding to a discussion of exhaustion, it is important to address an alternate preemption test and the courts' use of the term "sweep[ing]" in the preemption context.

B. "Positively Required by Direct Enactment"

As noted, courts deciding whether a congressional statute expressly or impliedly preempted state and local law usually consider whether there was a "clear and manifest purpose" to supersede these laws.44 In the domestic relations context, however, courts have sometimes used an alternate phraseology, holding that congressional preemption must be "'positively required by direct enactment' that state law be pre-empted."45 Interestingly, the Supreme Court actually applied this phrasing of the test before considering the "clear and manifest purpose" of Congress. In 1904, the Supreme Court found that the collection of alimony and child support was not preempted by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, stating that "[ujnless positively required by direct enactment the courts should not presume a design upon the part of Congress[,] in relieving the unfortunate debtor[,] to make the law a means of avoiding enforcement of the obligation ... to support his wife and to maintain and educate his children."46