Mail call

NFPA Journal, May/Jun 2001

* Smoke detectors

William Koffel's "In Compliance" column in the March/April 2001 issue asked how we can solve the residential fire problem, which is best answered through consumer education. Unfortunately, the fire safety community has failed to devote sufficient attention to this vital effort. Witness the fact that in 1994, the US. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) reported that there were 16 million smoke detectors in U.S. homes that weren't working. Ironically, CPSC found that there were more homes with non-functioning smoke detectors than there were homes without smoke detectors. In other words, in 1994, more than one out of every four homes with smoke detectors were just as exposed to fire danger as those without smoke detectors. It's safe to assume that the number of unprotected homes is even higher now, given the advanced age of detectors counted in 1994, not including missing or dead batteries.

CPSC found that the greatest number of faulty residential detectors were the ionization-type, battery-operated, which isn't surprising, considering that they're the cheapest and the easiest to install. Obviously, kitchens aren't the place to install the ionization type. Even minimal cooking activities will cause them to alarm... The detector of choice for kitchens, then, should be the photoelectric type, preferably AC-powered, with battery back-up. The fire safety community should include this recommendation in its public education campaign.

Of equal importance in informing the public is the matter of smoke entry. The test button can't test for this important feature, whereas an aerosol product can. I add, not just any aerosol, but one that's been approved by a recognized independent testing laboratory and has also been approved by the smoke detector manufacturer concerned, as provided by NFPA 72....

The foregoing suggestions, in addition to others, should be part of an aggressive public education effort conducted by, among others, NFPA, fire marshals, and insurance companies. Those involved in writing/maintaining building codes need to be involved, as well.

Leon Cooper

President, Home Safeguard Industries

Malibu, California

* Loading walkways

On behalf of the more than 58,000 pilots of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) and as a member of the NFPA Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting Aviation Technical Committee, I read the January/February 2001 NFP,Journal article, "Loading Walkways: Maintaining Safety," by Fred Walker with great interest. Some of our members have identified a significant concern in jetway design that wasn't mentioned in the article, which needs more attention at airports around the nation. This deficiency is the lack of uniform design of panic bars on jetway doors when exiting from the airplane into the terminal.

The issue of a clear egress pathway is important, as stated in the article. Of equal importance is the door opening mechanism at the interface of the jetway to the terminal, as viewed from the aircraft side. This is a tricky situation, since security issues necessitate that this interface also be secure from unscreened infiltrators into the airport terminal. In addition, the configurations of some international arrival terminals, such as long glass hallways or steel electric sliding doors with no on-door emergency releases, suggest that life safety could be at risk in some situations. Electrically locked panic bars, unsigned and counterintuitive, needing 15 seconds pressure to release, are also risky in the event of an on-airplane emergency.

This photo (below) is of a jetway door at a major northeastern airport. NFPA 417 says that "any door in the egress path through the loading walkway to the terminal shall swing in the direction of egress from the aircraft towards the terminal and shall be equipped with panic hardware on the aircraft aside." Imagine facing this door in a smoke-filled jetway as the deplaning passengers push the panic bar in the photo. (The panic bar isn't functional.) Close observation shows that the door has two additional latches above the unlatched panic bar. The middle latch is inoperative as well, and the upper latch has a small unmarked lever that must be rotated counterclockwise to unlock the door in order to gain access to the terminal.

Following four years of talks between the ALPA and airport management, these doors are now being equipped with appropriate panic bars. This situation may exist elsewhere in the nation. More codes need to reference NFPA 417. All airports should meet NFPA 417.

Captain Thomas L. Phillips, AAA

Air Line Pilots Association, Int

Hemdon, Virginia

* We save lives

I read George Miller's "First Response" column in the January/February 2001 issue with great interest.

I concur that we in fire prevention don't get the recognition for our efforts in preventing the loss of life and property that our coworkers do who ride the trucks. NFPA's use of a banner saying "We save lives" is excellent, and it's my hope that we can promote a similar philosophy, either by adopting it as our division's mission statement, on the back of our business cards, or some other technique.