interoperability issue, The

Sea Power, Dec 1998 by Walsh, Stephen W

Navy IPO Plays Major Role in Promoting U.S./Allied Relationship

"Bogey inbound!"-an announcement that gets the attention of every watchstander in every modern warship. One suspects that, for sailors the world over, such an alarm conjures up images of ships burning during the Falklands War, the near-sinking of the Perryclass guided-missile frigate USS Stark, or perhaps the Iranian Airbus tragedy. The speed and lethality of modern supersonic cruise missiles, increasingly augmented by the TBM (theater ballistic missile) threat, means that tactical reaction and decision times have been greatly decreased.

Faster, smaller, smarter, and stealthier weapons once were possessed by only a few nations. Today, these weapons are ubiquitous. When the U.S. Navy and its allies shifted their doctrine to the littoral, nominal tactical reaction times decreased further. Additionally, traditional reliance on speed, deception, exploitation of the ranges achieved by superior weapons, and other defensive advantages available in the broad ocean are less effective in the high-density, electronically noisy, and restricted maneuvering room of the near-shore arena.

Simultaneously, the proliferation to numerous other nations of very real ballistic-missile capabilities stretches the current threat horizon to well beyond visual range. Maintaining control of the battlespace in this environment is a considerable challenge. To maintain situational awareness, the on-scene commander requires voluminous tactical data-which must be organized in an understandable way-and must be able to sift it, classify it, prioritize it, and recognize the critical threat in enough time to act.

The future command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks envisioned by the U.S. Navy and frequently expounded upon by Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski (the Navy's former director of space, information warfare, and command and control), will be sophisticated and powerful enough, thanks to the advanced state of U.S. technology, to solve this problem. The real problem may be that the same high-tech solution may cause great difficulties for some allies. Naval forces around the world have the ability to project power ashore through amphibious operations, and therefore remain the true "911" service. That will continue to be true, but future naval forces will likely be smaller, more dispersed, and more individually lethal than they are today. Future naval surface combatants-like those envisioned in the U.S. Navy's 21st-century land-attack destroyer (DD-21) program-promise to pack ever more capability and firepower into a single hull. But in regional confrontations they will be increasingly dependent on high technology and the support available from allied navies.

A Global Refocus

As the millennium approaches, the security and geopolitical environment is changing drastically, and remains unsettled. America refocused its national security policies from a bipolar to a regional emphasis, and many of its allies have made the same shift. The United Kingdom's recently completed Strategic Defence Review (SDR) emphasizes mobility, maneuver, and expeditionarywarfare concepts much like those of the U.S. Marine Corps, the American armed force that the British Army is most likely to mirror. But the SDR also quite plainly questions whether closer ties to and seamless interoperability with European or American defense forces best support Britain's own interests. The French government has emphasized mobility and power projection. Perhaps most illustrious of this strategic sea change is the fact that German soldiers now are routinely deployed outside Germany as NATO members of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In the Pacific, Japan also has refocused its strategic view. The political problems related to the status of U.S. forces in Okinawa notwithstanding, the revised Defense Guidelines agreement signed in September 1997 signals a continued strong U.S./Japan partnership. Japan's current financial hardships are real, but the overtly threatening North Korean Taepo Dong-1 launch over Japan on 31 August 1998 seems to have brought the TBM threat clearly into view for Japan.

Greater Access, Fewer Acquisitions

Several other Pacific Rim nations have refocused their security strategies as well. A major strategic defense and security review was initiated in South Korea following the historic election of Korean President Kim Dae-Jung. Australia concluded its own national security review, issued the government white paper In the National Interest (subsequently augmented by the Australian Defense Department's Australia's Strategic Policy), and is implementing its precepts in earnest. Singapore, long a U.S. partner in security assistance, has offered significantly more access to the U.S. Navy, including enhanced training opportunities and pierside berthing for aircraft carriers. But Asian financial problems remain a critical security development that could damage economies throughout the world. With wholesale devaluation looming, many of America's Asian allies and friends already have been forced to scale back, in fact, or stop military acquisitions, deployments, and exercises.