Navy shipbuilding plan falls short; critics voice "concern and frustration"

Sea Power, Apr 2000 by Peterson, Gordon I

Spring-like temperatures in the nation's capital in early March did nothing to soften the frosty reception that the Clinton administration's proposed fiscal year 2001 defense budget received in some quarters of Congress. Of significant concern to many members of House and Senate defense committees was a Navy shipbuilding plan that falls well short of the funding needed to compensate for the administration's drop-off in ship construction since FY 1993.

Clinton's amended future-years defense plan, released publicly on 8 February, would-if fully implemented -procure a total of 45 new-construction Navy ships between FY 2000 and FY 2005. According to Ronald O'Rourke, a defense specialist with the Congressional Research Service, if the amended plan's average procurement rate of 7.5 ships per year were maintained over a 35-year period, a fleet of approximately 263 ships would result.

During a 2 March hearing on ship-acquisition programs and policies, Sen. Olympia J. Snowe (R-Maine), chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee's Seapower Subcommittee, voiced frustration with the disparity between shipbuilding-funding levels and the Navy's real-world requirement for more ships. "We're looking at these numbers, and we know what they should be," an exasperated Snowe lectured a panel of Navy witnesses, "so I don't know if the Navy is just dumping this in our lap or what."

At the time of the subcommittee's hearing, the Navy was more than one month late in submitting its long-range shipbuilding report to Congress, as mandated in last year's conference report accompanying the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act.

Stretched Too Thin

Speaking to a quartet of Navy and Marine Corps witnesses-led by Dr. H. Lee Buchanan III, the assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development, and acquisition-Snowe enumerated several concerns with Navy shipbuilding plans. She faulted a continuing "disconnect" between the underfunding of the Navy's shipbuilding program and testimony provided by Navy operational commanders last October. At that time, the numbered fleet commanders stated they have been stretched too thin to carry out the U.S. National Security Strategy with the numbers of ships and aircraft available to them.

"I don't see anything positive in the budget," Snowe complained. In Snowe's view, the reduced ship buy-and-build rates also will adversely affect the economic well-being of U.S. shipbuilders and other components of the U.S. defense industrial base.

Sen. Charles S. Robb (D-Va.) expressed similar worries. "This is a very serious shortfall situation," he said, "and there's no clear way ahead. The trend line is simply in the wrong direction." Robb said that he also was "frustrated and concerned" by the testimony he had heard.

"An Uncomfortable Margin"

Buchanan and Vice Adm. Conrad C. Lautenbacher Jr., the deputy chief of naval operations for resources, warfare requirements, and assessments, had little to say to mollify the subcommittee. Buchanan maintained that the administration's shipbuilding plan, while "certainly not robust," would maintain the industrial base-primarily through the plan's added investment in research and development, and the stabilization of the surface combatant build rate at two per year; he described the net result as a "necessary balance" in the face of constrained resources.

When Snowe pressed Navy witnesses to assess the likelihood that the Navy's shipbuilding plan would produce the necessary numbers of ships to satisfy fleet operational requirements, Buchanan conceded that it would provide only an "uncomfortable margin-a perilous, but positive, steady state." Lautenbacher also emphasized that the Navy's plan reflected the need to work within the cost constraints of current funding, but acknowledged that, "We need to build higher numbers of ships than we are today-there's no doubt about it."

A 30-Ship Backlog

O'Rourke's testimony on ship procurement heightened the lawmakers' concerns. He cogently described what the Navy must do to "get well" to compensate for the continued underfunding since 1993 of its shipbuilding and conversion account. "If the administration's amended ship-procurement plan is implemented," he said, "a total of 83 ships will be procured during the 13-- year period FY 1993-FY 2005, or an average of 6.4 ships per year." That building rate, he said, translates into a 30-ship "deficit" in ship procurement relative to the "steady state" ship-- procurement of 8.7 ships per year needed to maintain a 308-ship fleet.

"Eliminating this 30-ship backlog over the remaining 22 years in a 35-- year ship procurement period beginning in FY 1993 will increase the required procurement rate by about 1.4 ships per year above the steady-state replacement rate," said O'Rourke. For the next 22 years after FY 2005, therefore, a total of 225 ships will have to be procured-or an average of 10.2 ships per year. Navy witnesses did not dispute O'Rourke's analysis, and they acknowledged under questioning that his projections are accurate.