An alliance reunited?

Sea Power, Jan 2002 by Goure, Daniel

Europe

EU, NATO, ERRF, and Article V

There is no closer security relationship among sovereign nations than that between the United States and the nations of Europe, particularly those that are members of NATO. This relationship evolved over time as new members were added to the Alliance-- and one member, France, left its formal structures-and the nature of the threat to their security changed. The relationship weathered a long series of disagreements and conflicts about specific security concerns. The bond between Europe and the United States (and Canada) even survived the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War.

Yet, despite a 50-year history of adjustment to change, a shudder passes across Europe each time a new administration takes office in Washington. These episodic concerns are in part a natural result of the imbalance in power between the two sides of the Atlantic. They also reflect real differences on particular matters of policy. Finally, there is the belief, strongly held by many, that no U.S. president really understands European security issues.

European anxieties regarding the attitudes and policies of each new U.S. administration did not ease with the end of the Cold War. Even Bill Clinton, whose platform became the model for Europe's so-called "Third Way," did not initially fare well in the eyes of European critics of U.S. foreign and security policies. However, no U.S. president, save perhaps Ronald Reagan, caused as much early anxiety among Europeans as did George W. Bush. Even before his inauguration Bush had raised concerns in Europe regarding security policies that the allies thought had long ago been agreed to by Washington. In addition, Europeans feared that the Bush administration would take a much more confrontational line with Moscow at a time when it was hoped that Vladimir Putin, the new Russian leader, would prove to be a stable partner. Finally, there was a commonly held view in Europe that Bush was not sufficiently internationalist in his treatment of so-called global issues.

Friends in Need

Many of those concerns have been swept away by the events of 11 September and their aftermath. Talk of a growing transatlantic split has been silenced in the wake of Europe's reaction to America's tragedy. Nothing spoke louder about the inherent strength of the bond between the two continents than the minute of silence observed all across Europe. Great Britain leapt immediately to the aid of the United States. Others-including France, Germany, and Italy-followed suit. In addition, relations between Washington and Moscow appear to have shifted from wary sparring to close cooperation.

The long-term effects of the terrorist attacks on the United States, and of the international war on terrorism, are as yet, and for some time will be, unknowable. Some observers, in both Europe and the United States, believe that the result of the Bush administration's experience in coalition-building will have profound spillover effects on its overall foreign policy. These observers believe that the United States now will be less inclined toward unilateralism and more interested in seeking cooperative solutions to global problems.

The natural corollary of this view is that the United States also will be more receptive to the concerns and ideas of others-and, therefore, also will have a greater inclination to accede to the will of the majority on such issues as global warming, arms control, and/or trade.

Still others believe that both 11 September and the international responses to it are clear and convincing evidence of the continuing international "exceptionalism" of the United States. It is the U.S. position as the world's sole superpower that makes it the target of fundamentalist rage-or so it is alleged. It is that same superpower status that enabled the United States to rapidly bring together a global coalition to fight the war on terrorism. The United States alone possesses the military capability to conduct long-range, high-intensity military operations in inhospitable theaters.

It also is evident, at least to date, that, although the United States now seems much more committed than before to consulting with its coalition partners, the war on terrorism is being conducted according to Washington's rules.

Unhappy First Impressions

The Bush administration came to Washington seemingly intent on challenging the fundamental principles that had animated the defense and security policies of the Clinton administration. During the 2000 presidential campaign, the candidate and his closest advisors had made a number of provocative statements about security issues that affected Europe. Condoleezza Rice, soon to be President Bush's national security advisor, suggested that the new administration would review U.S. military deployments in the Balkans with an eye to reducing the presence of U.S. forces in that part of Europe. That suggestion seemed part of a larger concern among Republican policymakers that the United States needed to reverse the Clinton policies on peacekeeping missions, one result of which was that U.S. forces were being increasingly bogged down in a series of "nation-building" exercises that had little prospect for success, at least in the near term.