Letters

Sea Power, Jul 2003

LCS Waste

If you've ever wondered why taxpayers are outraged by government spending, look no further than the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. LCS is the Navy's solution to the many new threats our armed forces face in littoral areas, and as the bombing of the destroyer USS Cole and the mines in Iraqi waters have shown us, LCS is vital to our defense arsenal.

So, what's the problem? For starters, the LCS selection process is being loaded up with special-interest goodies based on political patronage. Consider this: The state of Mississippi, with a budget deficit of $100 million, provided Northrop Grumman with $50 million in bond proceeds to modernize its Ingalls shipyard for LCS construction, even though the contract will not be awarded until 2004.

Even more, Northrop Grumman's proposal is based on a relatively new and untested composite structure that will "revolutionize the effectiveness of small ships in littoral warfare." It seems ironic that, just weeks after they made their proposal, Northrop Grumman received $15 million to study if their "revolutionary" concept would work as advertised.

If Northrop Grumman's composite proposal is as superior as they've claimed, why do they need $15 million in taxpayer money to study its viability? And why is the budget-strapped state of Mississippi guaranteeing $50 million in bond proceeds to modernize Northrop's shipyard for a contract that hasn't even been awarded?

Taxpayers should be outraged. America needs the best defense money can buy, but can't we at least award new programs on their merits?

Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo., retired)

Chairman

Frontiers of Freedom

LCS Draft

There is an interesting aspect concerning the proposed draft of the intended Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) in your excellent article (May 2003), "Navy Explores Exotic Shapes, Materials for LCS."

A draft of 20 feet for an LCS is ex-cessive. Northern European light cruisers in World War II had similar drafts. Our Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates have a draft less than this. The Swedish Visby corvette that has been used as an example for such a craft has a draft of less than 10 feet.

I would hope the Navy would settle on a design that was truly capable of operating in shallow waters and not a relatively conventional warship simply called an LCS. I also would like to see the Navy consider choosing two of the six proposed designs if two of the six were quite similar in capability but radically different in design. Being relatively low-cost, such an approach might allow the Navy to evaluate more fully the various design aspects under sustained operational conditions.

Jack Greene

Los Oses, Calif.

Bainbridge and Constitution

In reading the article concerning the naming of two new navy ships [Sea Power, February 2003], I could not help but notice that, in discussing Commodore William Bainbridge, you never mentioned the fact that he was in command of the USS Constitution when it engaged and defeated the British ship Java. As a retired teacher of American history as well as a Navy veteran of World War II and member of the Navy League, I always enjoy reading your publication and am always in awe at the meticulous reporting which I find within its covers, but I do believe that you missed the boat, so to speak, by not having given Commodore Bainbridge due credit for having been a commander of what is probably one of the Navy's better-known vessels of early American history.

George A. Goodwin Jr.

Email

LCS Deja Vu

I noted with great interest the article in the May 2003 issue about the Navy's rush to develop an LCS fleet. The artist's concept-shown on page 15-of Textron Marine and Land's proposed hybrid ship immediately caught my eye.

Thirty years ago, Rohr Marine, a subsidiary of Rohr Industries Inc. in Chula Vista, Calif., designed a 2,000-ton high-speed Surface Effect Ship (2KSES), for which $46 million was authorized for research and design. When the time came to create the prototype, Congress, in its infinite wisdom, cut off the funding, and the craft became just another ghost on the drawing board. My first glance at the Textron ship made me think it was the Rohr creation, so identical are the lines.

Not long after the demise of the Rohr project, the Soviet Union launched a similar SES. I do not know if it is still operational or not, but the U.S. Navy missed a golden opportunity to float a high-speed multipurpose craft that would have been immensely cheaper to build than one at today's prices. Will we never learn, or are we destined to continue to reinvent the wheel (or, in this case, the SES)?

Paul B. Kincade

Reno, Nevada

MPF Offload

Your article regarding the MPF offload (May 2003) failed to mention the personnel who were responsible for the rapid offload, including the full component of active-duty cargo-handling personnel (combat stevedores) along with 74 Naval Reservists from Navy Cargo Handling Battalion Ten.

The reserve augmentation was in-theater within eight days of being activated and arrived in-theater standing hand-in-hand with the active-duty component. This rapid deployment of reserve augmentation allowed for the manpower to be in place to conduct these offloads in the timeline required. This was a major accomplishment.