Tanker basing limitations posed challenge during Operation Iraqi Freedom air campaign

Sea Power, Jul 2003 by Burgess, Richard R

The lack of basing for aerial tankers and the slow pace of some Marine Corps unmanned aircraft were among the few problems or limitations encountered by U.S. forces during the stunningly successful three-week war to overthrow Saddam Hussein and liberate Iraq.

Rear Adm. David C. Nichols Jr., commander of the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center in Fallon, Nev.-who visited the war zone to assess strike warfare during the campaign-said there was only one significant limitation to operations by naval aviation during Operation Iraqi Freedom: the availability of "big-wing" tankers.

The shortage of Air Force tankers-KC-135s and KC-1Os-was exacerbated by the sheer number of aircraft deployed in-theater for the operation: 1,707 aircraft at the start of the war. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps tankers transferred 12 million pounds of jet fuel on the first night of the war, Nichols said. A total of 159 Air Force tankers were available at the beginning of the air campaign to refuel the strike aircraft in-theater. The problem, Nichols said, was not so much the number of tankers available as it was the lack of "bed-down" capabilities-i.e., the relatively few bases available from which to stage the full complement of tankers needed.

The Air Force tankers were spread over 15 bases in the Iraqi Freedom area of operations, compared with 346 tankers staged at only five bases-and supported by a large fuel pipeline-during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Nichols said that the 15 bases required more logistics and infrastructure, particularly fuel trucks, to support fewer tankers. He cited the example of Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, where a line of fuel trucks four miles long was required, for a week, to build up enough fuel for the tankers flying from the base.

When the Turkish government refused permission for the U.S. armed forces to use Turkish bases for Operation Iraqi Freedom, plans to base 36 Air Force tankers in Turkey to support Navy strikes launched from the Mediterranean into northern Iraq fell through. The tankers then had to be staged at bases in other countries, such as Italy, that were much farther away from the area of operations. As a result, tanker transit times and the distances flown were longer; the turnaround time per mission had to be increased; and the amount of fuel available per tanker decreased.

The tanker bed-down plan was not formalized until late February 2003. Even then, Nichols added, "Planning assumptions did not have the clarity we needed until the second week in March."

The amounts of fuel transferred during the air campaign were staggering. The 159 tankers available on 20 March transferred 12.5 million pounds of fuel on the first day of the war. The number of tankers eventually was increased to 210 as bed-down and infrastructure gradually improved to the point where-on 5 April, for example-the tankers transferred 18.3 million pounds of fuel.

Nichols praised the tanker force and stressed that the Navy received its fair share of fuel. "The tanking we did have was distributed equitably across the combined air force."

The Navy's carrier-based tankers were able "to adapt and respond" to the situation, Nichols said, and that made "a significant difference." In the Persian Gulf, the Navy's organic tankers "gave us at least 72 close air support sorties per day." Nichols said that the Navy tankers launched from aircraft carriers operating in the Mediterranean also "made a difference in getting Navy airplanes to the fight."

Navy carrier air wings currently deploy with eight S-3B tankers, which are being replaced in that role by F/A-18E/F Super Hornet strike fighters equipped to provide in-flight refueling to other aircraft. When fitted with four external tanks and an aerial refueling "buddy" store, Super Hornets not only can transfer more fuel than an S-3B can, but also are able to keep up with a strike force at longer ranges-closer to the target, in other words-and at higher altitudes.

The range of a strike package of as many as four F/A-18C Hornets can be extended by the availability of just one F/A-18E, said Vice Adm. Michael Malone, commander, U.S. Naval Air Forces, and commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. The tanker shortage in the Persian Gulf was partially alleviated when two F/A-18Es and two F/A-18Fs staged from USS Nimitz to augment the Super Hornets on USS Abraham Lincoln until the Nimitz arrived in-theater.

Malone, Nichols, and other naval aviation flag officers discussed the air campaign at the Naval Aviation Symposium in Pensacola, Fla., on 9 May, and presented an upbeat assessment of the capabilities of Navy and Marine Corps air power.

Zenith of Readiness

Nichols gave credit to Gen. Tommy R. Franks, commander, U.S. Central Command, "for setting the conditions allowing us to win on the battlefield." He also thanked Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark for giving the high priority to fleet readiness that enabled the Navy to perform so well during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.