INTELLIGENCE IN WAR: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda

Sea Power, Feb 2004 by Munns, David W

INTELLIGENCE IN WAR: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda by John Keegan, New York, N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, Oct. 2003. 387 pp. $30.00 ISBN: 0-375-40053-2.

The fictional mystery of espionage continues to captivate public attention through high-tech sleuthing and steely agent provocateurs. The real-world utility of spying, however, is a more suspect topic, and one explored thoroughly by British author Sir John Keegan, long-time military historian and defense editor for The Daily Telegraph, in a fashion devoid of glamour and critical of peripheral intelligence's ability to claim victory in war. "This book sets out to answer a simple question: How useful is intelligence in war?" Keegan writes in his introduction. His not-so-simple answer is a series of complex case studies and, ultimately, an assessment of the value of military intelligence.

Dismissing romantic accounts of intelligence procurement in fiction, Keegan admits, "Much intelligence practice is mundane and bureaucratic, unamenable to treatment in readable form. Even the most mundane, however, is essential if intelligence is to be useful." In a chapter entitled "Chasing Napoleon," Keegan traces the historical limitations of intelligence in the 1798 chase by English Adm. Horatio Nelson through the Mediterranean Sea in search of Napoleon's French fleet. Although word had reached London that the French fleet was headed for Egypt, Nelson was at sea, cut off from communication other than the sparse signal system used for ships in British waters. The 73-day chase ended with Nelson destroying the French fleet through his "inspirational powers of leadership" among other notable qualities, but Keegan points out that Nelson's lack of adequate intelligence prolonged the hunt. He provides a counterexample of "ample intelligence" in a following chapter with an almost parallel, though land-based, chase of Confederate Gen. Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson during the American Civil War. Despite Jackson's inferior army, his "exploitation of the secrets of place and passageway in the complexity of the Shenandoah Valley" enabled him to evade Union armies who had "no accurate military maps."

It was the invention of the radio that truly transformed the way wars are fought on sea and land, as first evidenced in World War I, according to Keegan. Looking at the intelligence used in the Battle of the Atlantic during World War II, Keegan investigates whether intelligence can win a war or whether it merely catalyzes victory. He points to the Battle of the Atlantic and Sir Winston Churchill's claim that Allied code-breakers' locating German U-boats, and their subsequent sinking by Allied planes, allowed convoys to safely cross the ocean, sparing Britain's demise. Keegan observes, however, that "the Battle of the Atlantic could have been won without the assistance of code-breakers" because in 1943, the year in which the most numerous and contentious convoy battles were waged, only a fractional 139 of the more than 9,000 Allied ships that tried to cross the ocean were lost to Axis forces.

Keegan then takes issue with human intelligence, versus mechanical espionage. He looks into the effectiveness, and ineffectiveness, of counter-spy Gestapo agents in Nazi Germany, identifying the men and women of espionage and the benefits of Britain's intelligence forces in uncovering Germany's secret weapons program. The art, or chore, of spying was redefined post-1945, which leads the reader and Keegan back to his initial question: "How useful is intelligence in war?" Moreover, are intelligence exploits beneficial in the war on terrorism? Written before the capture of Saddam Hussein, Keegan hits the issue head on - high-tech diabolism employed in previous conflicts is futile when an enemy cannot be pinpointed. Al Qaeda is not a centralized force but rather is an adversary made up of radical factions who share only one goal: to spur a crusade against western ideology. Human intelligence, police, and undercover agents will prevail only as assistance to American armed services.

Keegan's irreverent, circumspect prose in Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda addresses the topical issue of military intelligence with cogency and realism. Keegan does not dismiss intelligence; instead, he observes that the men and women on the battlefield, at direct conflict, are the true force behind any victory. Intelligence can facilitate their efforts, but it is soldiers' passion, dedication, and stamina that claim triumph.

By DAVID W. MUNNS

Assistant Editor