Tower power

InTech, Jun 2004 by Pereles, David, Finan, Darrick

By studying the power quality across different regions, it is possible to build improvements and make preparations for future outages. For example, in geographical areas that experienced sags of just a few cycles, or frequency jitter, some small uninterruptible power supplies (UPSs) on sensitive equipment would probably suffice. Areas with outages of ten minutes or longer, or multiple short outages, would require larger UPSs. For facilities that saw outages of hours, a back-up generator would be the only viable option.

Minimize impact

Full disclosure monitoring and predictive maintenance have arrived just in time to manage skyrocketing electricity demand, connection loads, and downtime costs. And with the 2003 power outage, electrical system safety practices are more critical than ever.

NERC investigates 2003 blackout

The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) conducted a comprehensive investigation of the 14 August 2003 blackout and concluded the following:

* Several entities violated NERC operating policies and planning standards, and those violations contributed directly to the start of the cascading blackout.

* The existing process for monitoring and assuring compliance with NERC and regional reliability standards was inadequate to identify and resolve specific compliance violations before those violations led to a cascading blackout,

* Reliability coordinators and control areas have adopted differing interpretations of the functions, responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities needed to operate a reliable power system.

* Identified problems from studies of prior large-scale blackouts happened again, including deficiencies in vegetation management, operator training, and tools to help operators better visualize system conditions.

* In some regions, data used to model loads and generators was inaccurate due to a lack of verification through benchmarking with actual system data and field testing.

* Operating entities and regions did not consistently share planning studies, design assumptions, and facility ratings or subject them to adequate peer review.

* There was no consistent application of available system protection technologies to optimize the ability to slow or stop an uncontrolled cascading failure of the power system.

Source: NERC Actions to Prevent and Mitigate the Impacts of Future Cascading Blackouts, 10 February 2004 (www.nerc.com).

Behind the byline

David Pereles, power quality marketing manager at Fluke Corporation, has an MBA from Seattle University and a B.S. in electrical engineering from Trinity College in Hartford, Conn. Pereles is also a member of IEEE PES, NETA, and NFPA.