Trans-Atlantic Link secured, The

Scandinavian Review, Autumn 1996 by Stephensen, Olafur

While most Western European states are busy building a "European defense identity" and perhaps looking more east than west when making their security and defense policy, Iceland remains staunchly Atlanticist. Not even in the United Kingdom will politicians express a more heartfelt wish to preserve the TransAtlantic Link and the role of NATO in Europe's defense. Iceland, who is an Associate Member of the Western European Union (WEU), has spoken strongly against any kind of WEU's merger with the European Union and stresses that the development of a European defense identity must take place in close cooperation and friendship with the United States.

Iceland is the Transatlantic Link

There are several reasons for this, of course. First of all, physically speaking, Iceland is the Trans-Atlantic Link. Strategically situated in the middle of the North Atlantic, Iceland is indispensable to an Atlantic Alliance in a time of crisis. If the link breaks, Iceland will lose its unique position as an important NATO member-a position that has given a tiny nation much more influence in the international arena than could otherwise have been expected.

Secondly, even if Iceland considers itself a European country, its "defense identity" does not have to do with Europe. Iceland has no defense forces of its own, apart from a minuscule coast guard, and has relied on the United States for its defense for 45 years. The idea that European states are to assume more initiative and responsibility in the defense of Europe is not that relevant to a state that has no defense of its own. During the Cold War, Icelanders believed that apart from ensuring Iceland's own defense, they were making a contribution to the defense of Europe by allowing the stationing of U.S. troops in their country. If the U.S. does not defend Europe, who will? Icelanders would certainly not trust their fellow Europeans to take care of their defense.

Thirdly, the world is still an insecure place. Iceland has long ago abandoned its pre-war policy of unarmed neutrality, and the notion that in peacetime there would be no foreign troops in the country. In 1951, with rising tensions in international affairs, the government of Iceland somewhat reluctantly agreed that the definition of peacetime might have changed and negotiated a Defense Agreement with the United States, whereby the U.S. was granted a military base in Keflavik, 50 kilometers southwest of Reykjavik.

The base was fiercely opposed by socialists and hard-line nationalists, and for forty years the debate over its existence created the deepest rift in Icelandic politics. However, for the whole Cold War period, the majority of Icelanders accepted and supported NATO membership and the U.S. military presence in their country. Even after the end of the Cold War, Icelanders still believe that this presence is necessary. This is shown by opinion polls indicating that public support for the Keflavik Base has increased sharply in recent years.

Plans for Drastic Reduction Alarmed Icelanders

It should come as no surprise then that Icelanders were alarmed in the spring of 1993 when some government agencies in Washington aired plans to reduce the U.S. military presence in Iceland drastically for two reasons: (1 ) the changed world situation after the end of the Cold War, and (2) cost-cutting measures, that had already forced the closure of many military installations in the U.S. itself. The Iceland Defense Force had already been reduced, with the consent of Icelandic authorities. Two AWACS radar aircraft had been moved elsewhere, since the penetration of Soviet military aircraft into Icelandic airspace had ceased two years earlier. The number of Orion P-3 maritime patrol aircraft and F-15 Eagle fighter aircraft were also reduced, due to decreased Soviet aircraft and submarine traffic in the North Atlantic.

According to reliable sources, the Air Force had plans to deactivate its Fighter Squadron in Keflavik and deploy fighters from the U.S. if there was a threat of an air attack on Iceland. This would have meant that the number of U.S. troops in Keflavik was cut significantly. It would also have resulted in the deactivation of the Helicopter Search and Rescue Squadron-which has saved the lives of dozens of Icelanders, as well as American airmen, through the years. The Air Force had carefully planned this, made the budgetary arrangements and notified the relevant NATO agencies.

The Air Force took the view that the North Atlantic no longer needed the same patrolling as it did during the Cold War, so fighter aircraft were no longer necessary to intercept Soviet planes, and deep cuts in the Iceland Defense Force were justifiable. Iceland, however, saw the situation differently. In the talks between Icelandic and U.S. officials in the latter part of 1993, Iceland stressed that there were still security risks in the North Atlantic, especially due to the unstable political situation in Russia. Iceland, like the other NATO countries, therefore needed credible air defense, and this could not be maintained without stationing some fighter aircraft in Keflavik permanently.