Sweden and the new world order: Illusions and realities

Scandinavian Review, Autumn 1997 by Board, Joseph B

It has been centuries since the Nordic countries have weighed very heavily in the scales of world politics. Out there on the rim of Europe, they have been easy to overlook, and one usually searches American newspapers in vain for the most cursory acknowledgement of their existence.

The reasons are not hard to find. They have not caused trouble for others. Unlike the Middle East, the Balkans, or Southeast Asia, they seem a little too dull to generate headlines. A kind of journalistic Gresham's Law decrees that bad news will always drive out good, and that conflict is a better story line than stability.

Similar Cultures, Different Foreign Policies

Most of the North was once one country, and even today the cultural unity of these countries is a good deal closer than that which prevails between Vermont and Hawaii. Their domestic political systems resemble each other more than they differ, and they are almost identical in their commitment to democratic and constitutional principles.

In spite of these unities, their foreign policies have often differed enormously. Their experiences in WW II were quite different: Norway and Denmark were occupied by the Germans, Finland (aided by the Germans) was at war with the Soviet Union, and Sweden did what it had to do to remain neutral and independent. Iceland was preemptively occupied in 1940 by the British, a responsibility assumed by the United States a year later. Their experiences in WW II led to very differing responses to the challenges of the ensuing postwar years. Norway and Denmark became members of NATO (albeit with some reservations); Iceland also joined NATO but with even greater reservations; Sweden remained nonaligned (after a brief flirtation with NATO); and Finland adopted a form of neutrality whose hallmark was an understandable sensitivity to the realities of Soviet proximity.

Swedish policy attempted to take all of these differences into consideration. And there was always a certain ambiguity in Sweden's conception of its own neutrality, as well as more than a touch of irony in that Swedish security was tacitly dependent on NATO protection even when Sweden was pursuing a line highly critical of American policy during much of the period.

The Meltdown of the Cold War

Sweden, like America, became habituated to the Cold War during the forty years of its existence. Then, rather abruptly, Europe and the United States were confronted with the unexpected collapse of Communism, the disintegration of the USSR, and the end of the Cold War.

It is fair to say that the West was as unprepared for success as the Soviet Union was for failure. The radioactive version of Armageddon had been averted, the evil empire had self-destructed, and the demon had been exorcised. The result, however, was hardly one of relief that peace had broken out, but instead a mixture of uncertainty, confusion, and disarray. In an instant the contextual background of the Cold War, which had served as the raison d'etre of most foreign (and much domestic) policy had vanished from the radar screens of foreign policy Establishments everywhere. At the same time, ancient ethnic and religious conflicts, long suppressed by Superpower hegemony, erupted with renewed force and the perils of weakness and fragmentation replaced those of power and concentration.

Changes of this magnitude are bound to create difficult choices for all nations, large or small. And rather curiously they have linked the United States and Sweden, two countries otherwise quite unlike each other in scale and ambition. Both have found it exceedingly difficult to shed habits acquired during the Cold War and, as a result, their present approaches might be aptly characterized as "policies in search of realities."

Policies in Search of Realities

The United States seems intent on becoming nothing less than a kind of global orchestrator, or perhaps the guardian of democracy. From the inception of President Bush's talk about a New World Order, the U.S. has been trying to stay in the Superpower game even after the other Superpower has disappeared. Still at issue is whether an American public habituated by long custom to a policy of isolationism will be totally comfortable with global activism in the absence of a threat as palpable as Communism was or at least seemed to be.

Sweden has become more interesting to American security planners because of its pivotal position in the highly interdependent region of the Baltic Sea, and because of the strategic importance of the recently independent Baltic nations. The Baltic countries, who not long ago were provinces in the Soviet empire, and who have in their entire history known only a few decades of freedom from larger neighbors, have lent added importance to this part of the world. Sweden, Denmark and Finland all have extensive diplomatic, economic, even military contacts with these small nations. Whether any of them is ever to be incorporated into the new, improved NATO will probably depend on whether Sweden and then maybe Finland precede them in becoming members.