Marines Move "Forward From the Sea...." to Baghdad

Logistics Spectrum, Jan-Mar 2004 by Baldwin, Charles P

Brigadier General Michael R. Lehnert graduated from Central Michigan University in 1973 and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant through the PLC program. His worldwide assignments include Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; Okinawa, Japan; Republic of the Philippines; San Antonio, Texas; Camp Pendleton, California; Norfolk, Virginia; Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Cherry Point, North Carolina; Panama; Washington; and the Southwest Asia theater.

His most recent assignments include the Joint Warfighting Center where he served as the Chief of the Futures Branch, Doctrine Division; Commander, Marine Wing Support Group 27; Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4 II MEF; Chief of Staff, Joint Task Force Panama; and Assistant Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics. In 2003 he deployed with the 2d FSSG to the CENTCOM theater and participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom as Commander, Marine Logistics Command. Brigadier General Lehnert currently serves as Chief of Staff, United States Southern Command, Miami, Florida.

He attended the Armed Forces Staff College and the Naval War College in 1993 and was awarded a master's degree in international and strategic studies.

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) is organized and missioned as a littoral force, operating near the seashore. The area in which the USMC is expected to operate is nominally within 50 to 100 miles of the coastline. Their doctrine entitled "Forward from the Sea" reflects that operations farther inland are possible. This was demonstrated during the first Gulf War, Operation Desert Storm (ODS). Employment of an additional Marine Expeditionary Force's (MEF's) support unit, the Force Service Support Group (FSSG), to serve as a theater support unit was the strategy in both ODS and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Although employed in the early 1990s for ODS, the theater support organization was not documented or built for future use. BGen Lehnert commanded the Marine Logistics Command (MLC) and provided operational level logistics to Marine Forces engaged in OIF. Three FSSGs were committed to OIF. Two moved forward with the I MEF, and most of the third was organized into the MLC to operate theater logistics. The MLC had about 6,000 personnel, while the 70,000 Marine MEF had approximately 18,000 logisticians. In December 2002 elements of 2d FSSG assumed the operational logistics mission of the MLC and deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of operations.

As the operational level logistics organization, the MLC supported all Marine forces in Kuwait and Iraq and became the link between strategic and tactical logistics. The role of the operational logistician is fluid and demands continuous operational assessment and thorough mission analysis. It means expanding the limits of the possible by employing initiative, creativity, and adaptability in the design and execution of logistics operations. The MLC provided the landing force support party for multiple maritime prepositioning ship squadron (MPSRON) offloading operations, provided operational logistics support to all Marine forces, coordinated combat service support (CSS)/common item support (CIS) and common user land transportation assets with the Army's Theater Logistics Command; and supported regeneration, reconstitution, and redeployment operations to include port operations for incoming sustainment shipping.

The MLC initially focused on setting conditions for battlefield success through early arrival and executing reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSO&I) so that the 1st FSSG could move to their tactical positions and support other elements of I MEF. Concurrently, the MLC established Logistics Support Area (LSA) Fox, a 50-square-mile, 5,000-man camp complete with hard stand, warehouses, improved roads, seven self-contained subordinate camps, and the largest field ammunition supply point in the history of the Marine Corps. LSA Fox had been formed from a patch of desert in Kuwait defined by a single dirt track.

The request for forces methodology for sequencing forces into Kuwait for the invasion of Iraq resulted in the arrival of the combat forces before the support forces. The logisticians played catch-up to meet the needs of the I MLF and perform the MLC's responsibilities. The task for the MLC was to support the MEF as it conducted the supporting attack on Baghdad. The MLC operational assessment projected that the culminating point for ground transportation would be reached at the 200 mile mark. The shortfall in materiel support to the MEF would not allow it to further advance. Contract support for the forces in Kuwait (and Iraq after the offensive phase) played a large role in the Central Command wide support mission, but the Marines needed help during the attack. The answer was to immediately obtain contract trucks and drivers. Over 300 cargo trucks and fuel tanker trucks with drivers from 14 different countries were hired during the offensive phase to provide the additional line-haul capacity. This force was organized as a Third Country National (TCN) unit, under the supervision of a Marine major.