Senior Logisticians Compare Operation Iraqi Freedom/Enduring Freedom to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Logistics Spectrum, Jan-Mar 2004 by Steer, Frank R, Mahan, Charles S Jr

Could Admiral Fletcher consult with Lord Nelson before the Battle of Midway? No. Could General Bradley discuss the Battle of the Bulge with the Duke of Wellington? No. Can British and American logisticians compare notes on their experiences in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (ODS/DS) and Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF)? Absolutely! As good friends, loyal allies and members of SOLE's Board of Advisors, Brigadier General (Retired) Frank Steer (senior British logistician in ODS/DS) and Lieutenant General (Retired) Charles Mahan [former Deputy Chief of Staff G-4 (Logistics), Headquarters, U.S. Army] discussed the progress of logistics support. The dialogue below was originated at SOLE 2003 in Huntsville, Alabama. The history of ODS/DS and the insights from the former Deputy Chief of Staff G-4 (Logistics) are relevant, insightful and exciting.

Steer: ODS/DS had the same link back to the homeland for both our armies, although the war we fought the first time around was a little different in terms of the distances covered, certainly by U.S. forces. I think we agree we were both overstocked, and yet still did not know precisely what we had, or who wanted it when. I was told it was the same for you. So how, this time around, do you generally feel it went?

Mahan: The logistics operations were very successful. I am unaware of any constraint to the fighting force that was imposed by logistics shortfalls. When compared to ODS/DS, we did the job with a lot less, i.e., fewer people and equipment.

Steer: We were less dependant than you on civilian support during ODS/DS, but there was then a drift, that has grown considerably, toward the use of civilian assets for the management defense equipment capability and the use of what is referred to as just-in-time logistics backed by industrial surge potential in order to meet our war time needs, while at the same time reduce stockpiles and reduce inventory levels. My worry about just-in-time is that the basic laws of physics apply, in particular that one about matter neither being created nor destroyed, but always there is some form. That means someone out there is holding a hell of a lot of inventory just in case we want it just in time. Or we assume industry can surge, turning swiftly from the creation of high fashion jeans to combat clothing, from bean cans to bullets. Industry's track record on this has not been great, largely because of the time it takes to re-profile their industrial output. On the other hand, a stockpile is only one man's best guess, albeit an educated guess. So, is that the right way? Let's face it, it's a balancing act - so did you get the balance right this time around? If not, where do we take this issue; and what advice would you offer to your allies?

Mahan: The system used to meet the surge requirements incorporated industry, the Army's own industrial base, Army War Reserve Stocks and Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS). We realized that we had serious shortfalls and initiated a buildup of stocks during the period of hostilities in Afghanistan that gave us a five or six-month head start at meeting needs for OIF/OEF. There was a specific focus on aviation equipment and spares, and the munitions we would need to train and deploy the fighting force. From the strategic perspective, we had focused current resources on Army Transformation under the belief that it would be 2015 until another country could challenge us in this size of a conflict. We had been investing in new technology and preparing for the Army's Objective Force and thus needed an extraordinary effort to support Afghanistan and, now, this war in Iraq. Many individuals and organizations made excellent efforts to meet the Army's needs and are responsible for meeting the demands of OIF/OEF and supporting the resulting victory. Despite the logistics success, the speed of the attack and capture of Baghdad were fortuitous. Continued action for a couple more weeks would have exhausted supplies of some critical items, such as radio batteries.

Steer: The relationship with the commercial logistics base has always been, well, a little tense. And it hasn't just been the home base: there has also been the issue of Host Nation Support. Now, it is even more complicated with the globalization of commerce and suppliers sourcing material from pretty much anywhere they can find the best deal. However, that involvement is now much more closely knit than has been the case in the past. The commercial world has moved very much from the role of supplier to that of partner within an overall civil/military logistics framework. Is it successful? Do they each understand the needs and competencies of the other, and is this something that will grow and grow?

Mahan: The involvement of civilians in logistics functions has been our mantra. We have planned for and employed civilians on the battlefield for about 10 years. The support contractors that maintain equipment and perform other functions are critical in deployment of the force. The truth is that we can't go to war without them, but the issue about where they should be in the battle space has not been totally answered. Since we had a company CEO killed in Kuwait prior to OIF/OEF, insurance for contractor personnel has increased 300 to 500 percent. So the risk and subsequent cost of contractors on the battlefield may become untenable in wartime scenarios. Some major issues we need to come to grips with include where on the battlefield should they be, how we maintain discipline, and protecting or arming them. We will need to take contractors with us on deployments, but possibly limit them to the Intermediate or Forward Staging Base unless we can take advantage of more forward scenarios where we can keep them safe.