British left: For and against Europe? A historical survey, The

Capital & Class, Autumn 2007 by Mullen, Andrew

Employing a neo-Gramscian approach, and more specifically, Coxian historicism, this article argues that the European policies of the British left underwent three significant shifts during the post-war period: the first during the period 1945 to 1970 (from indifference to support), the second in the period between 1971 and 1987 (from support to opposition), and the third during the post-1988 period (from opposition to support). It further argues that these changes resulted from transformations in the balance of power between anti- and pro-EU forces, themselves linked to competing social forces at the global, European, national and institutional levels.

Introduction

More than thirty years after Nairn (1973) published his polemic, this article revisits the British left's 'great debate' on Europe. Mullen (2007: 7-9) argued that the European policies of the British left, taken as a whole, underwent three significant shifts between 1945 and 2005: the first during the 1945 to 1970 period (from indifference to support), the second during the 1971 to 1987 period (from support to opposition) and the third during the post-1988 period (from opposition to support). This article sets out to explain rather than simply describe these changes. It challenges the 'Europeanisation' thesis that the British left embraced the European Union (EU) in the post-1988 period, and suggests that if more and more sections of the British left resist the increasingly neoliberal EU-resistance already seen in the rejection of the euro and the European constitution-the post-1988 era may come to be seen, historically, as an interregnum rather than as a period that witnessed the total Europeanisation of the British left.

This article seeks to address some of the deficiencies of the existing literature, which is reviewed elsewhere (ibid: 2-3), departing from previous work in two critical respects. First, it surveys the European policies of the whole range of actors that constitutes the British left rather than using the Labour Party and Trades Union Congress (TUC) as proxies; and second, it evaluates policy formation and policy change across the whole post-war period, rather than focusing upon particular time periods.1

The first European policy shift (1945-70)

The first significant shift in the European policies of the British left, from a stance of indifference to one of support, occurred during the 1945-1970 period. A united Europe was a concept rather than a material reality in the immediate postwar period; but nevertheless, the idea of some sort of union as an economic and/or political entity was attractive to both capital and labour (Foreign Office, 1947; Cabinet Office, 1948).

There were two main fractions of labour in the 19405: national labour, organised on a national basis and working for firms producing for the domestic market; and transnational labour, also organised on a national basis but working for firms that were dependent upon international trade, principally with the Commonwealth. In terms of domestic policy, both fractions supported the economic and political programme of the 1945-1951 Labour government (Newton & Porter, 1988:104-05). However, in terms of foreign policy, there was some divergence. Attracted by the idea of Europe, most fractions of labour, whether national or transnational, backed the formation of a federal 'United States of Europe'. Committed to internationalism and enthused by the promised economic and political benefits of such a formation, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), the Co-operative Party, the Independent Labour Party (ILP) and the TUC, plus the Europe group and the Keep Left group within the parliamentary Labour Party, pledged support for a socialist third force in 1947 (Mullen, 2007:276). However, the Labour government, allying itself with the Foreign Office and the interests of transnational capital, preferred the 'imperialist third force' strategy, which envisaged the joint exploitation of Europe's former colonies under British leadership (Foreign Office, 1947). This confluence of support for Europe, whether imperialist or socialist, heralded the first significant policy shift on the British left.

The shift proved to be short-lived, however. Rather than becoming an enduring policy objective, enthusiasm for Europe dissipated in the late-19405, and for three reasons. First, the CPGB followed the Soviet Union and reversed its support for such an objective (CPGB, 1947). Second, the Labour government abandoned its imperial third force policy in 1948 in favour of the Commonwealth option, conceding that Britain did not possess the economic and political resources to sustain an independent foreign policy. It understood that the British economy, protected by the system of imperial preference, was dependent upon Commonwealth trade. It also acknowledged that in order to sustain its domestic programme, the Labour government needed access to the sterling balances provided by Britain's former colonies. Crucially, the Labour government, in parallel with transnational capital, realised that the European entity favoured by conservatives, liberals and socialists across continental Europe would force Britain to dismantle these tariffs, and would lead to the dissolution of the sterling area. A European federation was therefore perceived as a threat (Cabinet Office, 1955). Third, the USA supported moves towards a federal United States of Europe, but only if it was securely anchored within the capitalist, western system. In short, the USA opposed the development of the independent, neutral and socialist third force advocated by sections of the British left (State Department, 1951). Although the USA favoured a federal United States of Europe, and British leadership of such a formation, it tolerated Britain's attempt to pursue the Commonwealth option as the price to be paid for a compliant 'junior partner' (State Department, cited in Hennessey, 1992: 368). Furthermore, Britain's attempt to maintain its 'great power' status, manifest in its defence of sterling as an international reserve currency, its high military spending and its deployments of troops 'east of Suez', was of direct benefit to the USA in the sense that Britain shared the burden of global rule (Curtis, 1998: 16). The USA therefore permitted a degree of independence, enabling Britain to stand aside from the initial attempts to construct the EU. The Labour government participated in the European Recovery Program, supported the formation of the Council of Europe and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and backed the European Defence Community proposal. However, in each of these cases it advocated an intergovernmental rather than a supranational approach. When European institutions such as the ECSC were established on a supranational basis, the Labour government declined to participate (Mullen, 2007: 277).