COUNTING ON THEM

ASEE Prism, Jan 2007 by Grose, Thomas K

But Selker claims that printers and paper ballots are subject to possible fraud and software problems, too: Printers jam or fail to print properly. He advocates a "voter-verified audio audit transcript trail" system used in conjunction with a paper trail. It uses technology designed for the sightless. Each vote is repeated audibly to the rater via a headset and simultaneously recorded on tape. One added safeguard, he says, is the recording device is not made by the same company that makes the machine, so the software is written by different people.

Felten also recommends random audits of machines, not unlike the quality control measures used in manufacturing, where 1 percent to 2 percent of the output is checked at random for flaws. Experts also back parallel testing, which is now used in California and Maryland. On Klection Day, a few machines are taken at random from polling stations and then put to use as realistically as possible-so the software doesn't realize it's being tested-using mock votes to determine if they're recording votes correctly.

Computer experts are confident that, eventually, all states will put into place all or most of the backup systems that are needed to keep electronic voting machines from being compromised. "It will be the law," Selker says. Let's hope so. For American democracy to work, voters need to be absolutely confident that the final tallies on Klection Day are honest, even if they're unhappy with the results.

Thomas K. Grose is a freelance writer for a number of national publications.