Academia's "doctor death"

Human Life Review, Fall 1998 by Oderberg, David S

Indeed, it may be hard to believe, but for Singer newborn babies are in the same moral category as snails, since neither are capable of having a desire for the future: "Killing a snail or a day-old infant does not thwart any desires of this kind [for the future], because snails and newborn infants are incapable of having such desires:''1

Singer's general position, then, is that if "the family as a whole" decides that it is in its own interest to kill their child, that child should die.'2 "Parents may," he says, "with good reason, regret that a disabled [the first edition used "defective"] child was ever born. In that event the effect that the death of the child will have on its parents can be a reason for, rather than against killing it.'3

Mere regret-that is all that is necessary for the parents of an infant to be able to justify killing him; though as a utilitarian one must also consider the interests of the health care workers involved (would killing the child free up an urgently needed hospital bed?), other relatives (are they keen for the child to stay alive?), the government (does keeping the child alive, or providing drugs or other care, cost money that can be put to better use elsewhere?), and, in short, the interests of anyone who may be affected by the child's living or dying. Since it is the interests of society as a whole which are relevant, the primary question must be: Is this non 'person' a "burden" on society?14 After all, "There is a limit to the burden of dependence which any community can carry."15

In any case, Singer says, "It does not seem wise to add to the burden on limited resources by increasing the number of severely disabled children who will, if they are to lead a worthwhile life, need a disproportionately large share of these resources."16

Lest the reader think that it is just the young who are at risk in Prof. Singer's bizarre ethical universe, it should be noted that he is a champion of euthanasia for any adult whose life is "not worth living." Indeed, it would not be unfair to call him the thinking man's Jack Kevorkian?

In the first place any human being, at whatever age, ceases to be a 'person' if they are so disabled that they are deemed to have lost "rationality and selfconsciousness," if they are in a coma, or if they become a "senile elderly patient." In such cases, they are on the same moral level as any newborn baby, a level that is, as we have seen, very low indeed. But what about a human being who is capable of wanting to stay alive? What if they choose not to die?

Remember that Prof. Singer is a utilitarian, and so what matters is the overall calculation of costs and benefits, not any human being's particular desire to live. For example, elderly people might be allowed to opt out of being killed (in an advance directive) should they ever become "senile elderly patients," especially if this will prevent elderly people from living in fear for their lives. But if the balance of advantage requires it, their opt-out will be overridden." (Whatever Singer can be called, the supreme irony is that he cannot be called "pro-choice.")