Academia's "doctor death"

Human Life Review, Fall 1998 by Oderberg, David S

Whether a person desires to go on living may have some relevance as one element in the calculation, but it may well not be decisive. Still, people should be encouraged to believe that their desires are always of paramount importance, since otherwise everyone would live in great fear.

In other words, according to Singer, it is permissible to deceive people into thinking they have a decisive say over whether they live or die.ls Largescale deception is, in fact, at the heart of Singer's brand of utilitarianism. Nevertheless, he assures us, the practice of killing disabled babies should not instill fear in society at large, because "those old enough to be aware of the killing of disabled infants are necessarily outside the scope of the policy."'9 If anyone is safe in Singer's world, then, it would have to be professional philosophers-they must know what's going on, and so be "rational and self-aware" by definition.

I have tried, as much as possible, to present the views of Prof. Peter Singer in his own words. It should be apparent by now what he stands for. In short, he advocates the killing of disabled infants; the killing of any infant, disabled or not, if the "balance of advantage" requires it; the killing of children and adults who are non 'persons' by virtue of being comatose, or senile, or handicapped. The killing does not have to be voluntary (the victim wants to die) or non-voluntary (they are not capable of expressing their wishes), but may even be involuntary (they do not want to die). If they are capable of expressing their wishes it may well be right just not to consult them, because the "balance of advantage" might mean thumbs down but if they are asked they may kick up a fuss and make the whole process rather awkward.

There are many other aspects of Peter Singer's philosophy which have not been mentioned, but two should be noted in passing. For instance, although he disapproves of it, his moral theory implies the permissibility of "babyfarming"-that is, the "harvesting" of the organs and body-parts of babies whose lives are "not worth living," or of other non `persons,' so they can be put to better use elsewhere. One might, for instance, deliberately grow braindamaged embryos and foetuses who end up in a permanent coma, spending their whole lives as no more than an experimental spare-parts factory. I say his theory implies that this is all right, for obvious reasons-but he disapproves. Why, for Bentham's sake? Because, he answers, such practices would-wait for it-violate "the basic attitude of care and protection of infants," which is something "we must not imperil." Any commentary would be superfluous.

The second point involves the question of just when a non 'person' becomes a `person.' In an intriguing aside appearing in an interview in the London magazine The Spectator (September 16, 1995), Singer put forward a proposal: "Perhaps . . . we should have a ceremony a month after birth, at which the infant is admitted to the community. Before that time, infants would not be recognized as having the same right to life [sic] as other people" [emphasis added]. Why not two months? Or ten? Beats me-you'd better ask the good professor.