S. M. BAUGH AND THE MEANING OF FOREKNOWLEDGE: ANOTHER LOOK

Trinity Journal, Spring 2005 by McCall, Tom, Stanglin, Keith D

I. INTRODUCTION

When faced with questions about predestination, Arminians often respond by pointing out to their Calvinist interlocutors that in the NT it seems clear that predestination is preceded by foreknowledge. They believe that a straightforward reading of Rom 8:29 fits well with the Arminian view that predestination to salvation is based upon God's will to save and human response to the possibility of salvation, for here we read that the predestined are "those God foreknew." Arminians sometimes argue that their view is supported even more clearly in 1 Pet 1:2, for here we see that the elect are "those who have been chosen according to the foreknowledge of God." Drawing from passages such as these, Arminians maintain that predestination is based upon God's foreknowledge of which human persons will and which human persons will not (or would not) accept the offer of salvation.

In an influential essay, S. M. Baugh has attempted to rescue Rom 8:29 and similar texts for Reformed theology by arguing that the meaning of foreknowledge in the NT renders "impossible" the "Arminian notion of 'foreseen faith' ... as an interpretation of God's knowledge" when foreknowledge concerns predestination.1 He vigorously objects to the common Arminian interpretation-to Baugh such readings of Scripture import theology into the meaning of the sacred texts in a way that does unconscionable violence to them.2

Aware that his basic position appears to enjoy widespread support among recent and contemporary Calvinist theologians,3 we challenge Baugh's conclusions. In this essay, we look first at Baugh's word studies and the conclusions he draws from them. We then focus attention on the work that these conclusions are called to do for his theology, and we argue that he has not made a convincing case that the Arminian interpretation is "impossible." Noting that Baugh tends to conflate exegetical and logical issues, we find Baugh's arguments to be both unclear and unpersuasive; we conclude that he has not closed the door to the Arminian view of foreknowledge and predestination.

II. BAUGH'S ESSAY: AN OVERVIEW

Baugh begins by drawing attention to what he calls the "Achilles' heel" of Arminianism-its affirmation of God's foreknowledge of the future free choices of humans. He states that if God foreknows these free choices, then such choices "must be certain in a way that excludes the Arminian (libertarian) conception of free will."4 Baugh clearly endorses compatibilism; he insists on the reality of freedom while also maintaining that determinism is true.5 After briefly noting that Arminians respond to the problem of freedom and foreknowledge in different ways (and after labeling open theists "neo-Socinian in regards [sic] to foreknowledge"),6 Baugh then focuses on the meaning of foreknowledge in Scripture. He points out that God's knowledge is portrayed in the OT as "vast and perfect"; he insists that divine knowledge in both the OT and the NT (as well as in Greco-Roman literature) is both exhaustive and certain.7

Baugh offers what he takes to be a "rendering (that) better expresses the concept behind Romans 8:29: Those to whom he was previously devoted' . . . ."13

Baugh takes the same line in 1 Peter 1; he insists that the Arminian interpretation means that "God's choice is reduced to a ratification of the individual's autonomous decision."14 Holding to the idea that divine foreknowledge is God's prior, personal, and intimate knowledge of those persons who are predestined for salvation, Baugh maintains that in 1 Pet 1:1-2, "speaking about God's foreknowledge may be a way of expressing his eternal commitment to individuals as part of his determination to bring them to faith and to all the glories and benefits of Christ's work."15

But Baugh concludes more as well-indeed much more. He concludes that "naturalistic theology" is "germinal in Arminianism."17 He also concludes that Arminianism comes to "logical fruition" in Socinianism; Socinianism is a "consciously more consistent Arminianism."18 So Arminianism is an inconsistent and self-contradictory Socinianism,19 while the "neo-Socinianism" of open theism is "beyond the boundaries ... of Christianity."20 In other words, Arminianism is in big trouble. At best it is internally inconsistent and incompatible with the teachings of Scripture. At worst it is a deliberate departure from orthodox Christianity.

III. BAUGH'S ARGUMENTS: AN ANALYSIS

In either case, Baugh is arguing that because God's (fore)knowledge is personal, committed, and relational, then predestination is unconditional, Arminianism is false, and Determinist Calvinism is true. If this (or something in the neighborhood) is the argument, then Arminians have several lines of response open to them. First, Arminians can respond that (1) is ambiguous; it is too vague to be of much help here. For one thing, Baugh's characterization might limit the options even more than some Reformed theologians would want to allow. Some Reformed theologians might deny determinism while still attempting to hold to unconditional election in matters of salvation only, but Baugh's approach would not allow this. Indeed, it is arguable that some important Reformed theologians have taken this route.23 Even if it is not clear to us just how this approach might work (for reasons beyond the scope of this discussion, we are skeptical that it would), Baugh's approach would never give it a chance.24