Epistemology as Theology: An Evaluation of Alvin Plantinga's Epistemology

Trinity Journal, Spring 2007 by Madueme, Hans

James Beilby. Epistemology as Theology: An Evaluation of Alvin Plantinga's Epistemology. Burlington: Ashgate, 2005. xii 247 pp. $94.95.

In certain neighborhoods within modem theology, the relationship between analytic philosophy and theology has, to simplify a complex story, fallen on hard times. James Beilby renews the conversation in this fresh assessment of the theology-philosophy dialogue within Alvin Plantinga's rich corpus. Convinced that Plantinga's epistemology is of a piece with his theological background (Reformed), Beilby teases out several implications of this insight. The monograph grew out of a Ph.D. dissertation completed in May 2002 under Philip J. Rossi (Marquette). Beilby is currently Assistant Professor of Theology at Bethel College (Minnesota).

Structurally, the volume comprises six chapters, divided into descriptive (chs. 1-3) and evaluative (chs. 4-6) parts. The descriptive section contextualizes Plantinga's academic journey; we discover biographical details such as his religious experience of God while at Harvard (something that was to shape him for the rest of his life) and a scholar's mind tempered by theological and apologetic instincts. Chapter 2 examines Plantinga's early religious epistemology, including the birth of Reformed Epistemology (RE) and its critique of classical foundationalism. We also encounter his defense of the "parity thesis," implying that the absence of compelling arguments for God's existence poses no problem for Christianity.

In ch. 3, we move into his mature religious epistemology. Plantinga exchanges an exclusive focus on negative apologetics (deontological notions of justification) with uncovering what "distinguishes knowledge from merely true belief" (namely: warrant). In an extended discussion of the Warrant trilogy, Plantinga's Aquinas/Calvin model is described as a "set of propositions (or a state of affairs) that is clearly epistemically possible, and such that if it is true (or, if the state of affairs obtains), then belief in God possesses warrant" (p. 94). The deliverances of the sensus divinitatis (our innate sense of God) are properly basic. Because of sin, the Extended A/C model augments this account with the "internal instigation of the Holy Spirit" (IIHS) through which God persuades us of his work of salvation, producing faith. The payoff: Christian belief can have warrant.

In Beilby's evaluative section, debates triggered by Warranted Christian Belief are briefly considered (e.g., Plantinga's controversial use of historical figures, his rejection of historical criticism, his conservative views on the nature of God, and the theological "agenda" behind his epistemology). On his familiar objection to natural theology, Beilby concludes that Plantinga "is not a fideist, but one who does not believe there to be any common set of rational principle by which to adjudicate the truth of matters like the existence of God" (p. 126). More critically, however, Plantinga is faulted for setting the bar exorbitantly high against the success of natural theology. But good arguments, Beilby rejoins, need not start from "self-evident premises, utilize a self-evidently valid argument form, and produce conclusions with maximal epistemic status" (p. 127). It is enough that they have sufficient epistemic warrant and "a significant amount of psychological certainty" (p. 130).

Plantinga adopts the minimalist approach: "if Christian theism is true, then belief in God has warrant" (p. 135). This is flawed, counters Beilby, in that such an exclusive focus on negative apologetics -merely playing defensive-yields paltry results. Ordinary believers need positive apologetics, which RE avoids judiciously. Chapter 5 engages Plantinga's commitment to externalism. Here Beilby considers, but ultimately rejects, arguments condemning Plantinga's epistemology as too restrictive (is proper function necessary?) or too permissive (is proper function sufficient?). The final chapter raises further questions, including the relative absence of religious community in Plantinga's epistemology, and whether Plantinga leaves any methodological room for bona fide defeasibility of Christian belief. Beilby in fact challenges the notion of proper basicality of Christian beliefs and argues for plurality of reasons (basic and non-basic). He thinks "high depth of ingression" of particular beliefs (e.g., God's existence) is what is often really in view.

Finally, the closing objection relates to the Variability of Belief problem (VB). Plantinga assures us that a Christian's grasp of the faith qualifies as "firm and certain knowledge," but then admits that believers face lifelong battle with the noetic effects of sin. Beilby notes, however, that "a divinely instigated and enacted cognitive process like the [IIHS] would seem to be either 100% reliable or 100% unreliable" (p. 207). The VB problem arises in that "different Christians hold their beliefs about God with different degrees of firmness" (p. 203). This seems contradictory. Beilby suggests that an Arminien understanding of human freedom resolves the dilemma.