Framing the Public Square

Georgetown Law Journal, Nov 2002 by Wexler, Jay D

Framing the Public Square

GOD'S NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS. By Stephen L. Carter.* Basic Books, 2000. Pp. 256. $15.00 (Paperback).

INTRODUCTION

For at least the past decade or so, law-and-religion scholars have vigorously debated the issue of whether it is proper for American citizens to rely on religious reasons when talking about and reaching decisions on issues of public concern, including law.1 Those who argue that religion should be kept out of such decisionmaking and discourse contend that reliance on religious reasons: (1) violates principles of separation of church and state,2 (2) unfairly excludes nonbelievers from meaningful participation in public discourse,3 (3) creates unacceptable divisiveness,4 and (4) risks the domination of Christian beliefs in public discourse to the detriment of religious minorities.5 Those who disagree say reliance is proper for several reasons; they argue that excluding religion from such activity is impossible6 and unfair,7 that religious beliefs exist on the same epistemological level as other types of political and moral beliefs,8 and that allowing religion into the public square9 would in fact improve public discourse because religious discourse can be as open-minded and deliberative as so-called secular discourse,10 can provide novel perspectives that otherwise would not make their way into public discourse,11 and can generally enrich and deepen the overall quality of public debate.12

This argument within the field of law and religion is a subset of the broader philosophical question of whether in a diverse and pluralistic society citizens should "bracket" their conceptions of the good life-whether they stem from religious beliefs or some other ethical or moral convictions13-when talking about and deciding issues of public concern.14 The leading source of such bracketing arguments is the work of John Rawls, whose ideal of public reason, articulated in his Political Liberalism, states that "citizens are to conduct their public political discussions of constitutional essentials and basic justice within the framework of what each sincerely regards as a reasonable political conception of justice, a conception that expresses political values that others as free and equal also might reasonably be expected reasonably to endorse."15 Critics of bracketing such as Michael Sandel contend instead that "it is not always reasonable to bracket . . . claims arising from within comprehensive moral and religious doctrines,"16 and that such a bracketing requirement is an "unduly severe restriction that would impoverish political discourse and rule out important dimensions of public deliberation."17 A public discourse "shorn of any reliance on moral or religious convictions,"18 says Sandel, is one that is "too spare to contain the moral energies of a vital democratic life."19

It is probably the case that if the nonbracketing side were to gain substantially greater popular support in the United States, the most noticeable result would be a marked increase in the use of Christian language, symbols, texts, and other sources of authority in discourse regarding public issues. Although American Christians by no means hold similar views on all issues of public concern,20 86% of Americans in one study described themselves as adherents of some form of Christianity,21 compared to 8% who claim to believe in no religion at all,22 2% who describe themselves as Jewish,23 and less than 0.1% who describe themselves as either Taoists, Sikhs, or Shintoists.24 And while it is unclear whether some significant percentage of those who describe themselves as Christians also may subscribe to a nonreligious view of the good life,25 it seems overwhelmingly probable that Christianity, defined very generally, is by far the most common comprehensive worldview in the United States. As a practical matter, then, it is quite possible that a great deal of opposition to the nonbracketing paradigm of public discourse comes from those who fear a public square dominated by Christian discourse.26

Still, total domination of discourse by Christian voices is not necessarily the inevitable consequence of a public discourse that welcomes reliance on substantive views on the good life. If framed broadly enough, the public square would also permit other groups to rely on their fundamental views. These groups fall into two main categories: adherents of minority religious faiths and adherents of comprehensive but secular conceptions of the good life.27 If the nonbracketing paradigm were to become the dominant paradigm of our public discourse, then members of both of these groups would be able to inject their views on the good life into public discourse to counter Christian and other views with which they disagree.28 Explicitly inviting these minority views into the public square may persuade those who hold these views to relent in their opposition to a public square hospitable to religion. This could result in an inclusive public square filled with views drawn from a variety of different views of the good life-majority and minority, religious, and otherwise.