Facts, concepts, and theories: The shape of psychology's epistemic triangle

ABSTRACT: In this essay we introduce the idea of an epistemic triangle, with factual, theoretical, and conceptual investigations at its vertices, and argue that whereas scientific progress requires a balance among the three types of investigations, psychology's epistemic triangle is stretched disproportionately in the direction of factual investigations. Expressed by a variety of different problems, this unbalance may be created by a main operative theme-the obsession of psychology with a narrow and mechanical view of the scientific method and a misguided aversion to conceptual inquiries. Hence, to redress psychology's epistemic triangle, a broader and more realistic conception of method is needed and, in particular, conceptual investigations must be promoted. Using examples from different research domains, we describe the nature of conceptual investigations, relate them to theoretical investigations, and illustrate their purposes, forms, and limitations.

Key words: conceptual analysis, scientific method, language, epistemic state, psychology.

Regardless of their particular philosophical penchants, most scientists would probably agree that scientific development requires at least three kinds of investigations-factual, theoretical, and conceptual. When we examine whether an 8-month-old baby will reach for a toy that was removed from its sight or whether a rat will revisit an arm of the maze after the experimenter altered the extramaze cues, we are engaging in factual investigations. When we describe mathematically how pacemakers, accumulators, and comparators account for a pigeon's ability to regulate its behavior in time or how children construct the concept of time from the progressive coordination of the concepts of sequence of events, simultaneity, and duration, we are engaging in theoretical investigations. When Catania (1975) examined the consistency of the concept of self-reinforcement in learning theory, or when Piaget (1986) distinguished true knowledge from necessary knowledge in his theory of human development, each author was engaged in conceptual investigations.

These three kinds of investigations are closely interrelated, and to stress this point we visualize them as the vertices of an equilateral triangle. Factual investigations yield the elementary components of functional relations and theories, which in turn may be conceived as coordinating and animating facts, as bringing them to life. Conceptual investigations, on the other hand, check the intelligibility of theories, explicate their meanings, and identify their sensible domains. Although the separation among factual, theoretical, and conceptual investigations is not as sharp as we have implied, for heuristic purposes we will continue to stress the end points of the lines (i.e., the vertices of the triangle).

The interrelation among the three kinds of investigations implies that scientific growth will be hampered whenever any one of them is atrophied-when the epistemic triangle collapses, as it were, to a line or a point. Unconstrained by facts and functional relations, for example, theoretical and conceptual investigations are mere verbiage or idle speculation. Like Bacon's Idols of the Market Place, they "plainly do violence to the understanding and throw everything into confusion, and lead men into innumerable empty controversies and fictions" (Bacon, 1994, Book I, Aphorism 43). But if unchecked by theoretical and conceptual investigations, facts are blind, disorganized, and even meaningless. They multiply, "range widely, yet move little further forward" (Bacon, 1994, Book 1, Aphorism 70). Scientific communities must therefore strive to balance the various kinds of investigations, lest the growth of their science proceed in unprofitable directions.

The purpose of the present essay is to elaborate and use the preceding ideas to understand some of the problems that afflict contemporary psychology. Specifically, we will try to show that a variety of well-known problems in psychology reflect a pattern of unhealthy growth due to a disproportionate emphasis on factual investigations at the expense of theoretical and conceptual investigations, particularly the latter. In other words, psychology's epistemic triangle seems to have lost its harmony because it has been stretched excessively in the direction of facts. In the first part of this essay we analyze the expressions and costs of this distortion.

If our diagnosis is correct, then it follows that the harmony of the triangle must be restored before the problems can be solved. Conceptual investigations in particular must be promoted. But for that to happen we need to know first what accounts for psychology's excessive preference for factual investigations. This issue will be addressed in the second part of the essay. To anticipate our conclusion, we identify two fundamental reasons for psychologists' preference for factual investigations: (a) their overconfidence on the scientific method as a means of finding, almost mechanically, empirical truths and (b) their long-held suspicion of philosophical speculation.