Radical behaviorism and the rest of psychology: A review/precis of Skinner's About Behaviorism

Behavior and Philosophy, 2001 by Malone, John C Jr, Cruchon, Natalie M

ABSTRACT: Radical behaviorism is fundamentally different from traditional psychology, so it is not surprising that it has been widely misunderstood. It offers an alternative to the traditional treatments of mind that avoids some of the insoluble problems raised by those views. B. F. Skinner attempted many times to describe this alternative with limited success, partially attributable to the opacity of his prose and the excessiveness of his proposed applications. We offer annotated excerpts from one of his books dedicated to this end in an effort to show how his approach deals with topics usually viewed as "cognitive psychology." While modern radical behaviorism has progressed beyond Skinner's conception in important ways, his writings remain instructive.

Key words: Skinner's behaviorism, radical behaviorism, methodological behaviorism, cognitive psychology, radical behaviorism after Skinner.

The psychology of the late 20`" Century took two forms: one was radical behaviorism, distinctly the minority position. The majority position was the "rest of psychology." The "rest of psychology" was and is mediational, what B. F. Skinner would call "theoretical," and all of it can be viewed as subdivisions of cognitive psychology, broadly defined.' That is, the rest of psychology relies on explanations expressed in terms of underlying mechanisms.2 While there are as many of these "cognitive psychologies" as there are authors, there are really only two "behaviorisms.3" Methodological behaviorism is the kind most often described and criticized by outsiders-although it was never characteristic of Skinner's thinking. Radical behaviorism is very different and that is the name of Skinner's view and of variants on it. Leigland (1997) provides an excellent discussion of methodological and radical behaviorism-the interested reader will find no better source for clarification of this important distinction.

Radical behaviorism is not above criticism, of course. Skinner extrapolated far beyond his data, hoping to gain popular acceptance of his views. The strategy backfired-not only were the extrapolations often unconvincing (cf., Malone, 1975; 1982; Staddon, 1993), but he often "dumbed down" his version of behaviorism to promote communication with the public. This only provoked further criticism from those who had no way to distinguish the simplified from the sophisticated version (Hineline, 1990). For this and other reasons, very few critics have understood Skinner's behaviorism well enough to criticize it competently. We attempt here to present radical behaviorism clearly, showing how its interpretations apply to diverse areas. To this end, we use excerpts from one of Skinner's writings, hoping to prevent at least some future misguided critiques. We argue that Skinner was correct in criticizing mainstream psychology, which is irretrievably damned by its failure to correct the errors of history.

Traditional psychology carries the burden of basic assumptions that agree with folk psychology and, therefore, lend popular appeal to its theories (cf., Baum, 1994). Needless to say, these assumptions also feature primitive ways of casting some important questions. For example, the assumption that "we" are minds "inside" bodies agrees with millennia of popular opinion, but it is neither a necessary nor a wise psychology. Similarly, the facts of sensation and perception do not require that we take in copies of the world around us. Whatever the popular appeal, radical behaviorism does not accept such folk psychology.

Two Kinds of Behaviorism

In 1945, Skinner published an influential piece on the operational analysis of terms in which he attacked the prevailing philosophy of science that he called methodological behaviorism. This is the view that there is a distinction between public and private events and that psychology (to remain scientific) can deal only with public events. According to this view, private events are "mental" and, therefore, beyond our reach. This is the "arid philosophy of truth by agreement"(Skinner, 1945): something is meaningful or scientific (objective) only if at least two observers agree on its existence. Thus, private experience is excluded because it is subjective (by definition) and we can deal only with that which is objective. Methodological behaviorism and almost all cognitive theories leave the mind to philosophers.

It is almost invariably assumed that Skinner held the views of the methodological behaviorists and would not let us study the mind because it is unscientific (Anderson, 1990). That is absolutely false. Indeed, Skinner presented his own position, radical behaviorism, in contrast to methodological behaviorism! Radical behaviorism is Watsonian in that it does not distinguish between private and public events. In so doing, it omits nothing commonly thought of as mental, but it treats "seeing" as an activity similar in kind to walking (cf., Malone, 1990).

Skinner did not deny the existence or the importance of personal experience any more than did Watson, but he did deny the mind/body dualism of the mentalists and the methodological behaviorists. Thinking is something that we do, just as is walking, and we do not think mental thoughts any more than we walk mental steps. Personal experience is not necessarily "private" experience. That part of the world within our bodies5 is difficult to describe because society has a difficult time teaching us to name it. How can a parent, who tells us that a ball is "blue," tell us that we have a stomachache? The parent must assess public accompaniments such as swellings or wounds, collateral behavior such as wincing or crying out, and verbal reports established by past teaching when questions like "where does it hurt?" are answered. Furthermore, the parent or other questioner must expect metaphors in the answers of the child who will report such things as "sharp" pains or "dull" aches.