SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL BASIS OF ETHICS-A REVIEW OF MAX HOCUTT, THE

Behavior and Philosophy, 2003 by Waller, Bruce N

THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL BASIS OF ETHICS-A REVIEW OF MAX HOCUTT Grounded Ethics: The Empirical Bases of Normative Judgments. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2000, pp. xvi, $49.95 (hardback).

Max Hocutt's Grounded Ethics launches a spirited attack on all forms of rationalist moral theory. Hocutt marshals careful philosophical argument supported by a solid grasp of relevant psychological research and a thorough understanding of the history of ethics, and he offers no quarter to his rationalist targets. Densely packed with interesting arguments, vigorous assaults on opposing views, and a strong historical orientation to the major issues, Grounded Ethics is a demanding book that is worth the reader's effort.

Hocutt is a defender of moral relativism-hardly a popular theory in contemporary ethics. But Hocutt obviously believes in the old dictum that the best defense is a good offense, and the heart of the book is Hocutt's sustained attack on Kantian moral philosophy (including such well-known contemporary proponents of Kantian ethics as Stephen Darwall and Thomas Nagel). Even those who remain skeptical about moral relativism will find Hocutt's critical assessment of post-Kantian moral philosophy well worth examining.

Hocutt seeks no special grounds for morality: not in God, certainly not in reason (or Reason), nor in intuition. If morality is to be solidly grounded, the support must be found in social structures rather than intellectual exercises:

If we want to give the moral cynic a reason to behave as we wish, we must offer him not abstract philosophy but concrete social reform. The rest of us must so alter our behavior towards him that he cannot reasonably expect to prosper without doing his duty. Word magic will not do the trick. The answer to the moral skeptic cannot come from moral philosophy. It must take the form of concrete moral sanctions, (p. 41)

Thus the book's ambiguous title: grounded ethics. Grounded ethics refers not to ethics that have been bad and are confined to a room for a week, nor ethics grounded in natural law or natural science; rather, for Hocutt, ethics are grounded in concrete social sanctions and enforced rules, and outside of such specific social systems there are no ethics whatsoever. Thus, no legitimate ethical claims-claims of moral goodness or badness, claims of moral obligations-can be made except within specific societies, relative to specific social systems with ethical rules enforced by effective sanctions.

With this focus, it is not surprising that Hocutt treats the psychological study of behavior and behavioral conditioning with seriousness, sympathy, and sophistication. Behavioral psychologists may squirm as Hocutt speaks of "negative reinforcement," when he means aversive conditioning, but that is such a common misuse that it is almost standard usage outside psychology. In any case, psychologists will be placated by the fact that this is a philosopher who takes psychology very seriously and employs it in substantive philosophical work. For example, using psychological resources, Hocutt draws a very clear distinction between intrinsic and instrumental good, a distinction that philosophers sometimes muddle. More significantly, Hocutt draws on psychological resources to not only critique Kantian moral philosophy but to bring into clear focus the empirically improbable and even bizarre nature of Kantian ethics. Kant holds that moral acts must be good absolutely and must be done for no motive other than pure moral duty. For Kant, a moral act cannot be tainted with utilitarian concerns nor be motivated by any interest other than duty; in particular, it cannot be motivated by feelings of affection or kindness. Persons who perform kind acts from compassion or affection may be agreeable, but they are not acting morally. The person who feels no compassion or concern or affection for anyone but whose commitment is entirely to following the moral law (who acts not because it brings satisfaction to the actor nor because it brings joy to the receiver but strictly because it is dictated by the moral law) is the only genuinely moral person. Hocutt describes the basic problem with such a view thus:

. . .if the act reinforces neither its agent, its beneficiary, nor its observer, it is not clear why anybody would regard it as good or wish to make it a duty. The whole idea is paradoxical in the extreme, and so is the companion idea that an agent might be motivated to do what is neither itself reinforcing nor reinforced by other persons. What would motivate anyone to do what nothing in nature or society encourages him to do? This is a question for which Kant had no answer, no doubt because there is none. (p. 117)

Of course Kant does have an answer: the driving force that makes it possible to follow the stern dictates of duty is my will, a will that transcends all natural forces and natural laws. What Hocutt makes clear is how very strange this special will is. That probably would not bother Kant: he was quite willing to think of the will as transcending all natural influences. But contemporary philosophers are loath to base their views on such miraculous props. Kant may clothe his ethics in secular garb, but Hocutt effectively strips away the disguise to reveal its mysterious and otherworldly character.