SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL BASIS OF ETHICS-A REVIEW OF MAX HOCUTT, THE

Behavior and Philosophy, 2003 by Waller, Bruce N

Railton's insistence that equal weight be given to the interests of all conceivably affected parties invites us to take up not the point of view of an actual individual with definite interests and limited knowledge but the point of view of an omniscient and impartial deity-which is as "cosmic and absolute," so other-worldly and useless, as any ideal gets. (p. 243)

Hocutt is not rejecting the criticism of social rules and conventions: "A society's conventions do not, however, always determine what, in the society, should count as good, because that depends in the final analysis not on social conventions but on personal preferences. . ." Hocutt offers the following example:

Thus, eating crow could be made obligatory in a society, either by enactment of a rule of law or by evolution of a rule of morality requiring it, but this rule could not make crow taste good or nourish those who ate it. The existence of such a rule would make the eating of crow to be legally and morally just where it was required, but it would not make the practice to be either pleasant or beneficial, (p. 155)

So Hocutt is willing to critique a society's moral code and willing to ask what the society should count as good; but such critiques must be based on narrow identifiable interests of specific individuals, not on abstract ideals concerning what all perfectly rational persons might prefer.

Contemporary moral realists typically do not claim that they have established the existence of objective moral facts; rather, they insist that the existence of moral facts is an open empirical question, to be settled by empirical study. Thus, Michael Smith (1991) argues:

The existence of a moral fact-say, the Tightness of giving to famine relief in certain circumstances-requires that, under idealized conditions of reflection, rational creatures would converge upon a desire to give to famine relief in such circumstances.

Of course, it must be said that moral argument has not yet produced the sort of convergence in our desires that would make the idea of a moral fact. . . look plausible. But neither has moral argument had much of a history in times in which we can engage in free reflection unhampered by a false biology (the Aristotelian tradition) or a false belief in god (the Judeo-Christian tradition). It remains to be seen whether sustained moral argument can elicit the requisite convergence. . . (p. 410)

Though he doesn't use it in the context of critiquing moral realism, Hocutt has a very insightful argument that makes such "moral convergence" quite implausible. If there were one strong candidate for universal convergence, it would surely be the prohibition against murder: a universal prohibition that moral objectivists often cite as evidence of cross-cultural objective moral principle. But Hocutt swiftly undercuts the supposed universality of such a rule:

The universal existence of binding rules prohibiting murder does not suffice to guarantee the existence of a universally binding Rule prohibiting murder. Furthermore, we have no reason to think that any such Rule exists. On the contrary. Although indiscriminately killing other persons in one's own society is everywhere forbidden, indiscriminately killing people in other societies than one's own may be permitted, even required. So, although every society has a rule prohibiting murder, there is no Rule prohibiting murder in every society. Yet, the existence of such a Rule is just what the moral absolutist is eager to assert and must be prepared to prove, (p. 261)