SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL BASIS OF ETHICS-A REVIEW OF MAX HOCUTT, THE

Behavior and Philosophy, 2003 by Waller, Bruce N

Hocutt's carefully argued book is filled with insightful attacks on moral objectivism, and anyone who is skeptical about moral absolutism will find Hocutt a worthy champion. However, I find myself wishing he had stopped with nonobjectivism, rather than pushing on toward conventionalist relativism. Though Hocutt is clear that existing moral systems can be subject to vigorous criticism, his relativist view provides subtle support for the moral status quo. After all, to say that our only obligations are to uphold the moral rules of our society is to provide no small support for the existing rules: the language of obligation has substantial emotive force. Thus, Hocutt's relativist approach to nonobjectivist ethics has some affinities with Montaigne's (1603) use of skepticism to support the Catholic Counter-Reformation: since there is no objective way of determining the truth, we should "stay where God placed us," and not take up the banner of reform. This is hardly an argument against Hocutt; instead, it probably reflects our basically different political outlooks: conservative versus liberal, the difference between one who is skeptical of reform efforts and one who enthusiastically embraces reform. I think my side is more entitled to carry Skinner's banner into battle-after all, Skinner (1948) was not only a reformer but even a "practical Utopian" in his vision of Walden Two-and behaviorism has generally focused on the ways behavior can be changed and shaped for better results. Again, here is no argument, but just a personal reflection on why I find myself resisting Hocutt's relativism when I find much to admire in his spirited attacks on objectivist ethics.

This is a powerful book, dense with facts and rich in argument, and Hocutt is an impressive champion for an ethical relativism that has had few contemporary defenders. Any future attacks on relativism that do not grapple with Hocutt's sophisticated theory and rigorous arguments will be guilty of the straw man fallacy.

References

Hocutt, M. (2000). Grounded ethics: The empirical bases of normative judgments. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Montaigne, M. (1603). The essayes of Montaigne (J. Florio, Trans.). London: J. M. Dent.

Railton, P. (1986). Moral realism. Philosophical Review, 45, 163-207.

Skinner, B. F. (1948). Walden two. New York: Macmillan.

Skinner, B. F. (1971). Beyond freedom and dignity. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Smith, M. (1991). Realism. In P. Singer (Ed.), A companion to ethics (pp. 399-410). Oxford: Blackwell.

Bruce N. Waller

Youngstown State University

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Please address all correspondence to Bruce Waller, Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies, Youngstown State University, Youngstown, OH 44555. Email: bnwaller@aol.com.