LAUDABLE GOALS, INTERESTING EXPERIMENTS, UNINTELLIGIBLE THEORIZING: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF RELATIONAL FRAME THEORY

Behavior and Philosophy, 2003 by Burgos, Jose E

Even more explicit is the following statement: "In keeping with the inductive nature of behavior analysis, this concept of the relational operant will gain or loose strength through basic and applied research, rather than logical analysis per se" (p. 148, emphasis mine). The authors thus present RPT as a theory precisely in that it is an inductive generalization. This usage of "theory" follows Skinnerian conventional wisdom (e.g., Chiesa, 1994, pp. 134-143; Skinner, 1969, pp. vii-xii), so the ensuing criticism transcends the book, insofar as it applies to that wisdom. But the criticism is especially applicable to the book, for two reasons. First, the authors take that wisdom to an extreme that, contrary to their self-proclaimed anti-foundationalistic stance (see p. 34), involves an ontological assumption. Second, the authors are inconsistent with their self-proclaimed inductivistic stance. Let me elaborate.

The criticism in question is that the Skinnerian usage of "theory" amounts to little more than a redefinition of the term. As is well known, the standard sense of "theory," the one rejected by Skinner (1950), was central to logico-positivistic philosophy and reserved for statements about things, properties, or events that were unobservable in principle (through any kind of observation method).6 So why not use "theory" in this standard sense? Why redefine the term? Of course, everyone has the right to use any term in any way. However, the issue is not whether one can use any given term in any way one pleases, but why do it. So why use "theory" as a synonym of "inductive generalization," aside from merely having the right to do it?

To me, the redefinition in question is a self-granted license to claim that one's science is as theoretical as the next person's, as a defense against the criticism of "anti-theory." In the hands of behavior analysts and RFT researchers alike, and to purloin the authors' metaphor (see p. 89), the word "theory" has become a veritable "weasel word" used as an "escape hatch" to evade that particular criticism. The authors' assertion in this respect is most symptomatic: "The resulting misperception that behavior analysis rejects theories is ironic because it is one of the most theoretically oriented fields in all of psychology" (p. 143). What is ironic is that such an assertion is a clear example of the fallacy of equivocation: Conveniently shifting the meaning of a term to make a point. By the trivial device of labeling inductive generalizations "theories," they are able to conclude that behavior analysis is "theoretical," for which considering it as "anti-theoretical" is a "misperception." Playing Devil's advocate, I would reply something like this: "Well, you are calling what you do 'theory.' But I am not criticizing you for not using the word 'theory.' I am criticizing you for being an anti-hypotheticodeductivist. Using 'theory' in a different sense, as legitimate as that might be, does not answer my criticism. We might as well drop the term and my criticism would remain unanswered."7