REALISM ABOUT BEHAVIOR

Behavior and Philosophy, 2004 by Burgos, José E

ABSTRACT: Behavior analysis emphasizes the study of overt animal (human and nonhuman) behavior as a subject matter in its own right. This paper provides a metaphysical foundation for such an emphasis via an elucidation of a thesis that I generically call "realism about behavior," where by "realism" I mean an assertion of mind-independent existence. The elucidation takes the form of a conceptual framework that combines a property-exemplification account of events with modal realism in the context of three opposing philosophies of mind: property dualism, reductive physicalism, and type behaviorism. Each philosophy leads to the thesis that at least one possible world exists in which counterparts of all actual behavioral events occur and no counterpart of any actual "mental" (either nonphysical, neuro-mental, or behavioro-mental) event occurs. The third thesis is false because it violates the assumption that nothing can exist independently of itself, which leads to a rejection of type behaviorism. The other two theses provide the sought-after foundation through a counterfactual characterization of behavior qua behavior as a scientific subject matter. Its study thus becomes the study of behavior as if the nonphysical and the neural did not exist, even if they may factually exist and play a causal role in behavior. Some implications are discussed.

Key words: realism, behavior, events, modal realism, metaphysics, philosophy of mind

The description of Division 25 of the American Psychological Association (APA) begins with the following declaration: "Among the APA divisions that advance psychology as a natural science, the Division of Behavior Analysis is perhaps unique in its emphasis on behavior as a subject matter in its own right" (see http://www.auburn.edu/~newlamc/apa_div25/index.html). My aim in this paper is to provide a metaphysical foundation for such an emphasis.

My reason for seeking a metaphysical foundation is that, by and large, radical behaviorism, which is the philosophy that guides behavior analysis (e.g., Chiesa, 1994; Day, 1983; Moore, 1981; Ringen, 1999; Skinner, 1945, 1953, 1957, 1964, 1974; Smith, 1986, pp. 259-297; Zuriff, 1985), has been predominantly epistemological. Consequently, its metaphysical facet, although not entirely absent, remains far less developed. This situation requires attention, for a metaphysics-free, purely epistemological (and linguistic) philosophy of science is unattainable, as demonstrated by the demise of logical positivism, which was the strongest attempt in that direction. As a result of this demise, philosophers of science do not use the term "metaphysical" pejoratively anymore. On the contrary, they have revived metaphysical reflection (with important modifications, to be sure) as integral to the philosophy of science (see Papineau, 1996, and Seager, 2000).

Of course, such a revival is not meant to dispense with epistemological or linguistic considerations. The general position nowadays is that the metaphysical, the epistemological, and the linguistic raise different and equally important issues, and any resolution proposed within one does not readily transfer to the other. They are largely complementary, even if the precise form of their relations admits much analysis. Ultimately, every philosophical issue has the three aspects, and trying to reduce one to the others is futile. The present analysis will be predominantly metaphysical, but not completely devoid of epistemological and linguistic considerations. Be that as it may, an underdeveloped metaphysical facet is a serious weakness for any philosophy of science, radical behaviorism included. The ideal starting point toward amending this situation is to seek a metaphysical foundation for the emphasis on behavior as a subject matter in its own right. After all, this emphasis specifies no less than the very subject matter of behavior analysis as a natural science. If radical behaviorism cannot be a metaphysical guide in such a core aspect, then it can hardly be a metaphysical guide at all.

Within radical behaviorism, the only thesis that could provide the foundation in question is the rejection of a causal role of the private qua physical in behavior, which derives from a rejection of the private qua nonphysical. Regarding the latter rejection, Skinner, for example, wrote:

But where are these feelings and states of mind? Of what stuff are they made? The traditional answer is that they are located in a world of nonphysical dimensions called the mind and that they are mental. But another question then arises: How can a mental event cause or be caused by a physical one?1. . . .There are many other puzzling questions of this sort. What is to be done about them? The commonest practice is, I think, simply to ignore them. (1974, p. 10)

Skinner correctly pointed out that ignoring, denying, bypassing, or dismissing such questions, as has been traditionally done within behaviorism, is not the proper way of dealing with them. He thus submitted what he qualified as a radically different form of behaviorism (hence the label "radical behaviorism"), in which the internal (or the covert, or, as he was fond of calling it, the "private," or "the world within the skin") was embraced, but conceptualized as bodily, hence physical: