LOGICAL POSITIVISM, NATURALISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY

Behavior and Philosophy, 2004 by Kitchener, Richard F

ABSTRACT: According to the standard account, logical positivism was the philosophical foundation of psychological neo-behaviorism. Smith (1986) has questioned this interpretation, suggesting that neo-behaviorism drew its philosophical inspiration from a different tradition, one more in keeping with naturalistic epistemology. Smith does not deny, however, the traditional interpretation of the philosophy of logical positivism, which sets it apart from naturalistic epistemology. In this article I suggest (following recent historical scholarship) that a more careful reading of the leading figure of logical positivism, Rudolph Carnap, shows an important naturalistic component in his philosophy. Hence, we must reevaluate our standard interpretation of the philosophy of logical positivism and its relation to psychological neo-behaviorism.

Key words: behaviorism, Carnap, logical behaviorism, logical positivism, naturalistic epistemology, psychologism

The Classical View

There is (or once was) a widespread account of the philosophical foundations of psychological behaviorism. According to that account logical positivism1 was the foundation of psychological behaviorism,2 especially neobehaviorism. On this account the philosophical basis for neo-behaviorism was largely a set of epistemological views that was a combination of classical empiricism-all knowledge originates in and is justified by sensory experiencecombined with the new logic. These epistemological views, in turn, led to a certain conception of the mind or of mentalistic terms, variously called logical behaviorism, analytical behaviorism, physicalism, etc. In various ways these philosophical views supported the program of neo-behaviorism.3

According to one influential account (Fodor, 1968), a philosophical behaviorist is one who believes that necessarily, for each mental predicate that can be employed in a psychological explanation, there must be at least one description of behavior to which it bears a logical connection (p. 51). I call this kind of behaviorism semantic behaviorism, according to which for every mentalistic term there is some behavior (or behavioristic term) such that there is a conceptual (logical, semantic) connection between them.

Semantic behaviorism can take several forms. Analytic behaviorism is the view that for every mentalistic term there is some behavior (or behavioristic term) such that this behavior (term) constitutes the criteria for the (correct) application of the mentalistic term. This kind of behaviorism would be associated with RyIe, Wittgenstein, and Strawson. Logical behaviorism is the view that for every mentalistic term there is some behavior (or behavioristic term) such that this behavior (term) constitutes the verification basis for the application of the mentalistic term. This view is associated with Carnap, Hempel, and others. Logical behaviorism is often termed (or equated with) physicalism, the view that every sentence containing a mentalistic term can be translated into a sentence or sentences containing only physical terms. This view is also associated with Carnap, Hempel, and others. All three versions of behaviorism, however, are instances of semantic behaviorism, with differences concerning the semantic connection in question. Because my concern is with logical positivism, in the remainder of this article I will focus on logical behaviorism and physicalism; in fact, I will use these concepts interchangeably unless there is a special reason for making the distinction. It is, therefore, semantic behaviorism that is the crucial philosophical idea lying at the basis of many of the views of the logical positivists, and semantic behaviorism was a consequence of certain epistemological views of the logical positivists.

According to the classical view, therefore, the epistemology (and philosophy of science) of the logical positivists led to semantic behaviorism, and these views, in turn, were the basis for psychological behaviorism.4 The crucial question in the present context is the connection between this kind of semantic behaviorism and behaviorism as a research program in psychology.

This classical view is a thesis not only about the connections between logical positivism and psychological behaviorism, it is also a claim about historical fact: namely that the neo-behaviorists were historically influenced by these positivistic philosophers in the sense that the reading of their works (together with personal contacts) actually caused or influenced these psychologists to formulate their views about psychology. Before coming under the influence of the logical positivists, however, psychological behaviorists had no well-developed indigenous views about epistemology, philosophy of science, or the philosophy of mind.

Finally, according to this classical view, demonstrating the inadequacy of logical positivism threw into doubt the plausibility of psychological behaviorism. When logical positivism was shown to be defunct by its critics in the 1960s, neobehaviorism likewise became suspect because of its "vanishing philosophical support." Psychological behaviorism was shown to be implausible, inappropriate, or logically suspect.5