Moral intutionalism and the law inscribed on our hearts

Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, Dec 1999 by Mathewson, Mark D

A more plausible view is that while the moral law itself is not innate, an understanding or knowledge of it is. We are born with the knowledge of God's moral demands." We presumably become introspectively aware of them at a later stage of cognitive maturity. 12 Though this view is an improvement over the moral law itself being part of our constitutional makeup, several questions suggest that it may not be the best explication.

On this view questions arise as to the content of the law innately known. If knowledge of the law is innate, one must wonder of what this knowledge actually consists. Is the reference in Rom 2:14-15 to the whole Mosaic law, just the Decalogue, or simply general moral principles of which the Mosaic law and the Decalogue are specific expressions? The latter two options appear the most sane. On either of these options which commandments or principles are innately known? There appears to be no other basis than arbitrary decision on which to decide how many commandments (all, eight, five, etc.) are innately known or just what and how many principles are innately known.

Other questions arise as to the uniformity of this innate knowledge in humans. Do some people have innate knowledge of the law that others do not or is this innate knowledge uniform in every human? If the innate knowledge is not uniform (i.e. some innately know some of God's moral demands that others do not), why not? If this innate knowledge is uniform, what explains the fact that some do appear to know basic moral demands while others do not? For example, in some cultures individuals regard some forms of adultery (e.g. polygamy) as virtuous while others immediately perceive (just "see") it as a moral evil.

Now none of these queries concerning the content and uniformity of the innately known law is anywhere near fatal to that position (for instance, the effects of sin may be postulated as blinding our introspective abilities so that some "see" their knowledge of a moral principle that others do not). They merely call to attention an apparent lack of explanatory power that may prompt us to search for a position that yields more explanation.

A more difficult problem for the view of innate knowledge of the moral law is the very idea of innate knowledge itself. Whatever else may be said of innate knowledge, it does not appear that knowledge is something that can be innate. On most accounts of knowledge belief is a necessary condition. But, with knowledge conceived as innate, when did belief obtain? Beliefs do not appear to obtain prior to adequate cognitive development. At this point the proponent of innate knowledge may push the problem back a step and claim certain beliefs are also innately deposited in us by our Creator. As with knowledge, however, beliefs do not appear to be the kind of things that are innate. Beliefs are the result of conscious cognitive functions that cannot obtain prior to some stage of cognitive maturity. Furthermore, God does not do our believing for us-that is left to us. But, if beliefs then do obtain at a later stage of cognitive development, knowledge cannot be innate. 13