Moral intutionalism and the law inscribed on our hearts

Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, Dec 1999 by Mathewson, Mark D

In light of the explanatory and epistemological difficulties of this view, I would like to consider another option. The view I find the most plausible is that what is innate in humans is the cognitive capacity to apprehend and know the moral law. Neither the moral law nor a knowledge of it is innate. Humans are born with a natural ability of the mind to grasp immediately God's moral demands in an a priori manner. This capacity is actualized at some stage of cognitive maturity.

What recommends this view over the others? First, this view better fits into the context of Paul's argument in Romans 1 and 2. The view that our cognitive abilities to grasp moral reality are innate nicely parallels the innate abilities we have to grasp physical reality in Romans 1. Neither God's creation nor a knowledge of it are innate aspects of the human. Instead, we are born with the capacities to apprehend immediately and directly and noninferentially know the created order around us ("the external world" in philosophical parlance). Just as we have the innate capacity to perceive immediately and directly the external physical world and non-inferentially come to know it, so too we are inborn with the capacity to perceive moral reality (God's moral demands) immediately and directly and come to non-inferentially know it. In neither case is the reality nor the knowledge of that reality innate to us. Additionally, one wonders if the direct apprehension of the created order in Romans 1 should be limited to the physical creation. Perhaps God's existence and attributes are not only inferred from the physical world, but the nonphysical world (which includes moral reality) as well-"what has been made" (verse 20) refers to both realities. This would make sense in light of Paul's discussion and condemnation of the unbelievers' rejection of God, their immoral behavior in the remainder of chapter 1, and his clear denunciation of those who know the ordinance of God-"those who practice such things are worthy of death" (verse 32).

Second, the view that capacities to apprehend and know the moral law are what is innate better squares with the human as imago Dei. On the most accurate understandings of the image of God, the image is seen as multifaceted including both intellectual and moral aspects. 14 If humans reflect their Creator in these (and many other) capacities, it would appear that we best image him in apprehending and knowing moral reality ourselves rather than him simply depositing that reality or knowledge of it in us from conception. God does not do our knowing for us-moral or otherwise. As image-bearers, we best reflect God when we do that ourselves and even more so when we do it correctly.

Third, this view avoids many explanatory difficulties by remaining neutral about the exact content of the internal law that is known. On this view one is not obligated to postulate and then define a certain set of moral laws and/ or principles that every person knows-though one may wish to do so. Since no body of moral knowledge is innate, this view may better explain some differences (or potential differences) in the content of knowledge of the moral law from person to person and why some may non-inferentially know more of this law than another. In section three I will take up the question of whether the lack of some innate law or knowledge of that law leaves open the possibility that an individual may never gain knowledge of God's moral demands at all. I think it does not.